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Chapter 1
Making Cents of it All: Why Bottle Bills?
Resource reuse and recycling has been commonly and creatively incorporated into
communities worldwide in a wide variety of ways. This type of process only became formalized
into its own sector after the Industrial Revolution incited the advent of a society that uses resources
quickly, often inefficiently, and without consideration of disposal costs. Disposal costs include the
transport, breakdown, and economic valuation of the costs, or benefits (typically the latter) that
waste disposal leaves upon people and the surrounding environment. However, in the present
economic system it is typically more profitable for producers to skip this step, as there is often no
requirement to cover these costs or take preventative action to reduce waste. This lack of
acknowledgement of the production of waste serves to make it invisible, despite the very tangible
impacts that waste inflict upon industry, people, and communities. As Ayers describes, “we persist
in referring to the ‘final consumption’ of goods as though material objects such as fuels, materials,
and finished goods somehow disappeared into the void” (284).
In an effort to push back against this erasure of waste and other environmental issues, many
places implement forms of structural environmental policy. There are two major kinds of
environmental regulation: command and control and economic market-based regulation
(Harrington et al., 17; Olmstead). These two typeos differ in the techniques they use to encourage
compliance, or discourage noncompliance, with environmental policy. Command and control
policies are “expected to solve the problem either through control of the processes that lead to the
problem ... or through amelioration of the problem after it occurs” (Holling, 329). This type of
policy creates sweeping solutions to problems with the understanding that they are “well-bounded”
issues, with simple cause and effect origins, while in reality many environmental issues are rooted
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in a “complex, nonlinear, and poorly understood natural world” that are not easily “solved” by
command and control policies (329).
A more flexible method, and the type that is the subject of this paper, is market-based
environmental regulation. These types of systems use economic incentives as the driving force
behind its policy, rather than punitive threats for noncompliance. While market-based regulation
can inflict higher costs on those being regulated, they tend to provide significant economic savings
through its efficient system (Harrington, 17). Bottle deposit systems experience similar types of
successes and struggles, as they greatly reduce litter, promote recycling, but have been criticized
for increasing costs to consumers and the beverage industry.
The Container Recycling Institute defines a bottle bill as, “a minimum refundable deposit
on beer, soft drink and other beverage containers in order to ensure a high rate of recycling or
reuse.” In the course of this research I will use the terms ‘bottle bills’ and ‘container deposit
legislation’ interchangeably. Both terms refer to all types of recyclables that are currently covered
in some container deposit systems in the United States which can include glass bottles, plastic
bottles, and aluminum cans for the beverages beer, malt drinks, soda, mixed spirits, quine, liquor,
juice, sports drinks, and mineral water. This type of litter is targeted by a deposit system because
beverage containers of these types historically make up between 40-60 percent of the total volume
of litter and are made up of a type of material that is easily recycled (Geiger, vii; Moore, 59).
Currently ten U.S. states and Guam have active container deposit legislation, as do many
other countries around the world including Canada, Australia, South Korea and others. While
bottle bills have proliferated across the nation and the world, these legislations are not all identical
and their distinct variances can produce differing results and impacts. This research will investigate
the influencing factors in passing or defeating bottle bills as well as the various nuances and
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implications of the differences between the legislations in the states of Oregon, Maine, Washington
and Massachusetts.
Bottle deposit market-based environmental regulation spread like wildfire through the
environmentally activated American political system of the 1970s, resulting in six more states
enacting various bottle deposit systems within the decade. Immediately, oppositional arguments
against bottle deposit systems emerged from the beverage industry, citing the legislation’s
detrimental effects on beverage prices, beverage industry jobs, and called its litter-reduction
impact mediocre. This furious spread of policy and consequent controversy also created significant
space for research and reports on the efficacy of bottle bills--many of which are consulted and
analyzed for bias in the course of this research. Many even assumed that a national bottle bill was
inevitable (Beverage Container Reuse Hearings, 281).
My form of assessment for analyzing the comparative successes or failures of bottle bill
systems through a wide range of variables is the Triple Bottom Line (TBL) definition of
sustainable practices. A term coined as a multidimensional response to responsible business
management, this framework requires consideration of environmental, “social and economic
dimensions of sustainable development” (Elkington, 1997). As this research deals with an
intersectional issue of business, policy, and economics that have resulting environmental, social,
and economic impacts, this TBL assessment of true sustainability best allows me to compare and
contrast the ways in which some states’ bottle bill systems flourish or fall short.
This research is a case-based comparative analysis between bottle bill campaigns and
policies in four different U.S. states in order to analyze the determining and preventative variables
in the passage of bottle bills. Additionally, this study compares what ways these legislations are
ultimately effective or ineffective in meeting economic, environmental, and social goals. These
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four case study states have been selected to exemplify several public, private, and mixed systems
that display varying outcomes in participation in the program and impacts on litter and local
economies.
Bottle bill systems are well-suited to be analyzed with this comprehensive framework
because they can provide economic, social, and environmental benefits to the places where this
kind of deposit system is implemented. Economically, bottle bills create jobs in redemption,
transportation, and create high quality recycled products in high demand by recycling facilities.
Further, the unredeemed deposits from containers not returned results in a large pool of money
that can be strategically used for state spending, environmental projects, or to fund the container
program itself. Environmentally, bottle bills have proven themselves to be powerful mechanism
to decrease litter and to conserve resources through a monetary incentive to reuse and recycle.
While it is to be expected that much of the literature on the subject focuses on the cost and
economic efficiency of the market-based regulation, I believe that there remains a hole in the
literature that fails to directly recognize the ways that deposit systems are entangled in local, state,
and even international social systems. It is within this arena that this research is one of the first to
explore the social services and social and environmental justice aspects of bottle bills. Scrounging
for metals, plastics, and glass increases with the presence of bottle bill systems and the opportunity
for redemption provides a valuable social service as a source of income for people who are
fundraising, low-income, or the unhoused.1 Scrounging here, is defined as “to seek to obtain by
irregular means” (Ferrell, 8).

Here I use the term ‘unhoused’ rather than ‘homeless’ because the latter term equates a house with a home, which
is not always the case (OSL).
1
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This research is a case-based comparative analysis between bottle bills and bottle bill
campaigns in four different U.S. states in order to discover what variables support and prevent the
passage of bottle bills, and in what ways this type of system is ultimately effective in meeting
economic, environmental, and social goals. The foundation of this research is built upon nine
interviews with experts, activists, and government staffers who are or have been previously
involved with the bottle bill systems in their respective states. These insights have proved
invaluable to the quality and relevance of my work, and I greatly appreciate their knowledge and
willingness to share it with me.
This research is an in-depth investigation into a highly specific issue, but the conclusions
found here ultimately display wider implications about environmental policy on the state level,
suggest powerful campaign techniques, and consider the true sustainability of recycling in the
context of the globalized world of today. Bottle bills also brings the concept of “consumer
citizenship,” into the discussion. Consumer Citizenship is defined as, “an individual who makes
choices based on ethical, social, economic and ecological considerations. The consumer citizen
actively contributes to the maintenance of just and sustainable development by caring and acting
responsibly on family, national and global levels” (Thoreson, 7). Bottle bills are a type of consumer
citizenship because rather than considering a way to end the production of an enormous amount
of beverage containers, it develops a system to make the end result of this production not as
environmentally detrimental. While acknowledging the significance of this standpoint and the
unintended consequences both positive and negative that can result from it, this study ultimately
takes a critical view of the way that capitalism limits the imagination of environmentalism and
corresponding policy to stay within the constraints of consumerism.
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The following chapter outlines the relevant major literature concerning bottle bills: state
environmental history, political campaign science and strategy, and the international recycling
market. Chapter 3 is a depiction of my methodological structure for this research, as well as an
explanation of the independent variables that influence the effectiveness of the system and the
outcome of bottle bill campaigns Chapter 4 and 5 analyze and compare the bottle bill campaigns
in the case study states of Oregon and Maine, and Washington and Massachusetts, respectively. In
Chapter 6 all case studies are studied under a different form of comparative analysis to determine
relative success of the bottle bill programs under the framework of Triple Bottom Line
Sustainability. Chapter 7 explores the international implications of bottle bill systems and tracks
the travel and impact of recycled materials internationally. The final chapter will conclude the
results of this research and discuss the wider implications of its findings.
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Chapter 2
Scholarship and Perspectives on Bottle Deposit Systems and Related Issues
Refillable to Disposable: Setting the Stage for Bottle Bills
Bottle Bills represent a complex intersection of politics, private industry, local economy,
environmentalism, social services, and global trade. A Pigouvian tax system is the inspiration for
the bottle deposit system, which is one that “requires a consumer to pay a fee at the time of disposal
that is equal to the marginal damage caused by the disposal” (Ashenmiller, 2011). Using a marketbased disincentive to regulate littering, bottle bill systems instead require a fee payment at the
point of purchase. Then, it establishes a deposit refund program that refunds the initial fee paid
when containers are appropriately recycled.
Container-deposit systems of recycling materials are a worldwide phenomenon and have
long been used both formally through legislatively authorized procedures, and informally through
both private business efforts and street scrounging. In the United States before 1935 most
beverages were sold in refillable glass bottles from family firms and businesses. Within these small
scale grocers and corner stores, an informal bottle return system was built upon container reuse,
where the glasses would be reused up to 50 times until too worn down to reuse again, when it was
then permanently recycled (Gitlitz, 2013). This system is still common in many countries today,
even in the absence of monetary incentives due to the refillable nature of glass bottles and the
presence of refilling systems by beverage companies (ILSR).
However, the intense period of technological innovations during and following World War II
spurred the beginnings of today’s culture of disposability, largely through the rising popularity of
new materials for containers. Steel was used for beer and soda cans starting in 1935, but was beat
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out by the powerful introduction of single-use aluminum cans in the late 1950s. Plastic was also a
heavyweight addition to the materials arena. Post-war, one plastic executive stated, “virtually
nothing was made of plastic and anything could be” (Rogers, 2005). A 1955 article in Life
magazine called “Throwaway Living” celebrates the potential for human liberation through a
culture of disposability—especially within the home (Life Magazine, 1955). Plastic bottles hit the
U.S. market in the 1950s and quickly became popular as a very common one-way product for
stores, grocers, and restaurants (Walth, 284). In the late 1960s this sense of freedom from singleuse items began to be truly questioned by the growing environmental movement. Milestone
publications such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring brought the national attention to the unintended
dangers caused by commonly used chemicals and disposable products.
Reports and Studies on Bottle Bill Impacts
Studies disagree on the significance that beverage containers hold within the makeup of the
total litter portfolio prior to any bottle bill system. One study shows that beverage containers make
up about 20% of the total litter portfolio2 in rural areas, and 10% in urban regions, but the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that beverage containers represent about 2030% of all litter by piece count, and 40-60% of volume (Geiger, vii; Moore, 59).3 With this
discrepancy in mind, it was still the case that outdoorsman Richard Chambers was so dismayed by
the prevalence of litter in his community that he brought the preliminary idea of a deposit system
to the attention of several prominent state politicians. Ultimately, the Oregon State Legislature
passed the nation’s inaugural bottle bill legislation in 1971.

2

However, whether this litter metric is measured by percent piece count or percent volume is unclear.
Another item that greatly contributes to litter is paper products, although no other single group of throwaway
products are as prevalent in litter as the beverage container bottle or can (Maine House, 3/25/76, 686).
3
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A large portion of the literature consulted for this research include reports and analyses of the
functioning bottle bills. These policy reports focus on the litter reduction, costs, energy
conservation, and economic impact from state container deposit systems. Sources including
Gudger and Bailes (1974) and government reports of the Office of Technology (1979) on the
subject have provided a large amount of the economic and energy specific data that has been
referenced throughout the course of this research.
These policy reports tend to be either highly favorable of a highly antagonistic toward bottle
bills. Robert Geiger, for one, is critical of them in his piece, “Beverage Container Deposit Laws:
Are They Effective?” The major criticisms here include that the major goal of beverage container
deposit policies, at their time of passage, to decrease litter fails because beverage containers are
only a small fraction of the total litter profile. Additionally, he argues that while bottle bills may
establish some entry-level jobs, they take away more highly-skilled positions within the beverage
manufacturing industry. He argues that this is the case because the greater system needed for bottle
bills creates more lower-wage jobs for sorters and transporters, but decreases the amount of skilled
manufacturing positions due to the presence of a competing market of recycled materials (62).
Instead of a mandatory bottle bill, Geiger supports voluntary recycling systems that include
command and control methods of fines for littering culprits. The author shares several examples
of Washington state and Ohio’s alternative approach to litter control that he claims, “demonstrates
that American communities can be clean without overburdening local government budgets and
consumer pocketbooks” (Geiger, 71).
Similarly, Moore and Scott lay out a wider survey of the impacts of Bottle Bills during an antiregulatory period in the country’s history during the Reagan administration. In their 1983 research,
they begin by noting the caveat that there exist several flawed research designs underlying so-
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called empirical studies in the field. Their major results show that with this caution in mind, bottle
bills provide positive environmental benefits, but have shown to cause negative economic results
in regards to lower employment of higher level jobs in the beverage industry and increases in
container prices and production costs at least in the short-term (77).
Other studies have shown far more supportive results for bottle bills. Don Waggoner, an
Oregon businessman who worked to pass the state’s bottle bill lays out the benefits of the Oregon
system in his survey conducted through the Oregon Environmental Council called, Oregon’s Bottle
Bill: Two Years Later. This 1974 report shows that Oregon’s roadside litter decreased by 39% in
piece count and 47% by volume (xi). Gudger and Bailes specifically investigate the economic
impacts of the Oregon Bottle Bill and conclude that enforcement costs are minimal, no change in
sales volume of beer or soft drinks occurred, and inflation skewed the impact of the bottle bill on
price of beverages and no product price increases could be conclusively supported by the data.
Further, this study showed that the bottle bill’s standardization of malt beverage bottle sizes has
made the refillable system more easily implemented (25). This aspect of the bottle bill is elaborated
upon further, as it also served as a compromise to help gain support of local businesses.
A frequent contest to bottle deposit systems is that alternative litter laws are more appropriate
for litter reduction and are less economically intrusive than bottle bill systems. In support of this
argument, Geiger cites the Institute for Applied Research Study that 73% reduction in litter in 43
test sites in the state thanks to the presence of the Washington State Litter Control Program, noting
that 54% of the litter in Washington is from paper products, not beverage containers (1976). While
voluntary recycling systems may also help reduce litter, it requires far more funding, $1 million in
the case of Washington State, and necessitates administration to enforce violations (Beverage
Container Reuse and Recycling Act Hearings, 1977). The bottle bill in Oregon, just next door to
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Washington, reduced an estimated 47% of its litter and uses no public money to run (ODEQ). The
system is estimated to have created annual savings of at least $366,000 from not having to pick up
as much litter as before (Gudger, 68). Further, bottle bills provide a specific infrastructure for
which to track recycling participation, which expands the impacts of the bottle bill past litter
reduction to a wider goal of resource conservation that can be guided by comprehensive data
collection facilitated by a deposit system.
Types of Sources Referenced
Legislation, reports, transcripts, task force publications, and committee presentations from
state governments also shed important light on the multi-step, political process of passing a bottle
bill. These sources also display the barriers and concerns of stakeholders that faced the legislation
at the time of the bill’s attempted passage. This research will conduct a thorough exploration of
the existing or proposed legislation and campaigns of the states Oregon (1971), Maine (1972),
Washington (1970, 1979 and 1982), and Massachusetts’ proposed bottle bill expansion (2014).
Ballotpedia is a reliable website to access legislation and corresponding information about
ballot campaigns and campaign funding that was referenced frequently throughout the course of
this research. Bottlebill.org is a site managed by the Container Recycling Institute and provides a
database of bottle bills around the world, key facts, full legislative text, news updates, and has a
feature to compare aspects of U.S. bottle bills. While it is a source that directly studies, supports
and promotes Bottle Bills in the United States, it nonetheless is a well-cited, comprehensive
reference to the details of the types of container deposit systems that are implemented in the US
and around the world which I have valued greatly during this study.
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Stakeholders
There are a multitude of stakeholders who are impacted by state bottle deposit laws.
Initially, there is the state government. The bill might pass into law through the state legislature
which would require one or several state legislators to act as sponsors and would involve many
governmental discussions, compromises, and committees before the final draft is eventually put
up to a vote and potentially passed. If a bottle bill is passed on the public ballot, then it still requires
administrative involvement from the government to run and verify the public elections. Depending
on the details of the bottle bill system, the state government may play a role in the continuing
management of the deposit system, may use taxpayer money for the program, and in some cases
the government is the recipient of the funds from the unclaimed bottle deposits.
Private industry can also be involved in the administration of the bottle bill. As is discussed
more in later chapters, Oregon has ultimately created a unique management system for its state
bottle bill that largely excludes the state government and therefore does not use public money in
its day-to-day functioning of the law. This system uses a cooperative that has the membership of
98-99% of all beverage distributors within the state of Oregon (Bertges). This consolidation of
businesses allows the cooperative to streamline the refunds of beverage containers to consumers
across the state from the various beverage distributors. This entity, called the Oregon Beverage
Recycling Cooperative (OBRC), is an enormous stakeholder in support of Oregon’s Bottle Bill
and is funded by the unclaimed deposits for unreturned bottles.
Consumers are another critical stakeholder and interest group in regards to bottle bills.
Americans consumers in states with bottle bill systems pay an upfront fee of 2-15 cents (depending
on the container type) at the checkout counter, and then have the opportunity to receive their
deposit back upon container redemption. Additionally, it is important to note that bottle deposit
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systems also are a significant form of income for fundraising efforts, homeless, transient, or lowincome people. Research such as The Empire of Scrounge by Jeff Ferrell discusses the recycling
and dumpster-diving lifestyle, but there seems to be significant gap in the literature regarding the
importance of bottle bills for these more social, alternative-income creation benefits (2006).
Across the nation, support for bottle bills has largely been shown to be positive through both
opinion polls and demonstrated support through the action of returning beverage containers.
Consumers react to price of goods during their decision to purchase or not purchase something.
Because of this basic economic principle, consumers are a central concern of another stakeholder
group for whom consumption is their bottom line: beverage retailers. Beverage retailers here
means businesses that are not involved directly in the production of beverage products, but sell
them secondarily within their businesses directly to the consumers. These stakeholders can range
greatly in size from family-owned “Mom ‘n Pop” stores to mega grocery corporations. Retailers
are often linked in with bottle bills because they are concerned about increased prices on beverages
discouraging consumption. Grocery stores are also some of the most common locations for
container redemption (Spendelow, Sylver). Beverage retailers also cite research that states with
bottle bills often have higher prices of products, which is a method of passing the additional costs
onto the consumer, (House 3/24/76, 624).
Beverage producers, distributors, and corporations are also stakeholders in this issue. Beverage
distributors are different than retailers and producers, as they typically have a business relationship
with producers and navigate the sale of products to retailers. Most of these corporations are the
large, national or international companies including The Coca-Cola Company, Anheuser Busch,
and Pepsi-Cola Company. These beverage corporations are pretty consistently opponents of
container deposit legislation and bottle bills because of their concern that an increase in the
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checkout price on their products will cut into their profits by discouraging them from buying as
many products If a handling fee is present in a bottle deposit system, it sometimes is the distributor
who must pay the several cent fee per bottle (Gitlitz, 2001). This reality often makes beverage
distributors anti-bottle bill. Beverage industry members such as bottlers, aluminum smelters, and
container manufacturers tend to join in oppositional “anti-bottle bill coalitions” with other
opponents of the legislation.
McCuan and Stambough, in their study of how contributions to ballot-issues impact election
results find that there is a strong link between funding source and electoral outcomes, and that it
is significant to the electorate where the money comes from. However, the details of that
information is not always widely disseminated (2005). In the State Legislatures, as well, the antibottle bill funding and lobbying has proven very powerful, despite initial support commonly
displayed from the public for the legislation. A North Carolina Senator said, "I have touched no
bill since I have been in the legislature that was more popular with the people -- or more despised
by the opposition." (North Carolina, Bottlebill.org).
Corporations are not necessarily anti-environment, although they may take on environmental
goals for profit-motivated reasons. A phenomenon called “astroturfing” has emerged where
corporate forces back grassroots movements when the goal is favorable to them (Walker, 293).
One example relevant to this topic is the Keep America Beautiful group, which was founded in
1953 with a mission to “inspire and educate people to take action every day to improve and
beautify their community environment” (KAB). While this goal greatly appealed to
environmentalists, KAB was actually founded by a group of business representatives from the
packaging and beverage industries after they realized that the market’s transition to disposable
products was having a negative impact on litter. Keep America Beautiful has consistently opposed
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bottle bills, funded oppositional campaigns, and proposed alternative litter legislation that is more
preferred by the industry, despite the fact that bottle bills have proven to be highly effective at
litter reduction, the organization’s main goal (“Keep America Beautiful”; Spendelow).
Recycling agencies or facilities are also stakeholders. Bottle bill systems have shown to
increase the return rate of beverage containers into the local recycling system (Cahn, 1980). This
type of legislation tends to increase the amount of material input, and ultimately profit for these
companies (Moore, 64). Additionally, due to the sorting inherent in the bottle bill process, the
quality of material for recycling is typically much higher in states with bottle bill systems
(Lakeman). This is also an important quality to consider when analyzing the way that bottle deposit
systems fit into the international recycling market, as is considered further in Chapter 7. Another
group of ardent supporters include the environmental community. The diversion of waste from
landfills for reuse, energy savings from recycling, less demand for mineral and resource extraction,
and decreased litter all are reasons that environmentalists support bottle bills (Moore, 60). The
supporting coalition typically has a foundation of environmental groups.
This paper examines the details of the container deposit legislation at the point of the legislative
passage or failure. Research compiled by the Container Recycling Institute displays that there has
been a significant slowdown in the passage of bottle bill laws and expansions, and even some laws
that have been repealed. Table 2.1 lays out the timeline of bottle bill related legislations at the state
level from 1970-2014. This table only includes bills of proposed initial container deposit
legislation,4 not expansions, that got reached a vote, either within a chamber of the state legislature
or on the public ballot. It is extremely common that bottle deposit legislation is never brought to a

4

Only includes deposit systems, not outright bans on containers.
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vote or fails meets the requirements for the ballot. In state legislatures, most bottle bills die in
committee or are otherwise avoided through political means. The following timetable cannot
encompass all of the hundreds of proposed pieces of bottle bill legislation that were “indefinitely
postponed” or sent to die in committee.
The figure on the next page displays a concentrated rise in bottle bill proposals in the 1970s
and early 1980s, with a noticeable gap in proposed legislation between 1988 and 2002. Several
states had multiple attempts to pass bottle deposit systems, with only about half ultimately
succeeding. Bottle bill legislation on the ballot proves much harder to pass over time, with just 3
of 12 ballot proposals passing into law. Studies show that the number of initiatives on all issues
are decreasing, especially at the state level (McCuan, 263).
One shift on the political stage since most of these bottle bill legislations were passed is
the 2010 Supreme Court ruling of Citizens United vs Federal Election Commission. The ruling in
favor of Citizens United legally permits corporations and unions to spend unlimited amounts of
money on the political candidates of their choice through the intermediate body of a Super PAC.
John Coates argues that the ruling of Citizens United has prevented politics from reflecting the
opinions and goals of its individual stakeholders and citizens because it legally protects
shareholder interests through campaign results in this new “corporate democracy” (657).
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Figure 2.1

Research by Haight et al. displays the increasing ease in which these national corporations
can influence the outcome of a supposedly democratic election (7). For example, large
corporations like Coca-Cola and Anheuser Busch funnel millions of dollars into anti-bottle bill
campaigns across the country. Further, bottle bills are not being proposed to state governments as
frequently, especially within the last five years. In fact, the data and policy sites Ballotpedia,
Container Recycling Institute and Bottlebill.org, show that only one bottle deposit system,
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amendment, or expansion has passed the ballot or state legislature since 2010 (Powell). However,
it is important to note that proposed legislation to repeal bottle deposit systems was also defeated.
The effort to expand the bottle bill to include more types of beverage containers for
redemption other than beer and soda containers has been at the center of many political discussions
of bottle bills over the past decade. This research will specifically explore the 2014 rejection of a
proposed expansion of the bottle bill to include plastic water bottles in the state of Massachusetts.
Viscusi et al. explores the specific topic of water bottle recycling practices in their 2009 piece,
“Discontinuous Behavioral Responses to Recycling Laws and Plastic Water Bottle Deposits.” This
source is specifically relevant to the case study of Massachusetts. This paper explores the
contradiction that waterbottles experience in contrast to standard economic theory: for actors to
either recycle diligently, or not at all. Ultimately, Viscusi concludes that water bottle redemption
appears differently from the deposit system of other containers because “the measures have a
transformative effect, shifting individual consumers from not recycling at all to becoming
committed recyclers. Consistent with our result that people respond in a discontinuous manner to
recycling incentives, policies have their greatest effect among those who would not already choose
to recycle” (25).
Major aspects of the bottle bill literature discuss the deposit price, impacts of the price on
consumer habits, and the effectiveness of the system on litter reduction. States in the U.S. that have
bottle bills have deposit prices that range from $0.02 to $0.15, depending upon the type and size
of container. The impact of bottle bills upon beverage prices with rebate opportunity has been the
focus of many studies including Criner which found that a comparison of Maine beverage prices
with non-bottle bill states such as New Hampshire and Rhode Island, Maine sodas were priced
between 14 and 16 cents higher, and beer was 1-2 cents higher in cost than NH and RI (37).
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Research conducted by Santoni and Van Cott in 1977 states that for some consumers, mandatory
deposit laws will increase the price of beverages. Therefore, the system requires a 14.26% decrease
in litter “in order to be considered efficient” (1977). However, debate began between academics
of the BLM and these scholars about the methods for measuring litter reduction (Loomis, 1978).
Loomis maintained that the research in the Santoni and Van Cott paper was misleading in their
measurement of the change of amount of containers recycled before and after the legislation. This
type of methodological debate is common within the existing literature on this topic.
Altogether, state-administered bottle bill systems do create costs, but this net loss is often
counteracted by assigning a per container price value on unredeemed containers that returns to the
government through a full or partial escheat. Escheat is, “a common law doctrine that transfers the
property of a person who dies without heirs to the state (“Unclaimed Deposits”). Depending on
the amount of containers that are returned or not returned for their deposit by consumers, this can
be a large source of revenue for the state (“Unclaimed Deposits”). Economic analyses of the
predicted impact of a bottle bill in the state of Maine lists increased costs for grocers, brewers,
bottlers, and distributors, but a total gain of over $3 million under a returnable system due to
reduced litter collection, reduced costs to consumers, and container cost savings for brewers and
bottlers (O’Brien, 1975; Ginn, 1973).
Social Issues and the Bottle Bill
As I mentioned earlier, there is a gap in the literature about the connections between social
issues and bottle bills. Many of my interviewed sources have shared anecdotal information that
bottle bills are a powerful form of alternative income creation and fundraising, albeit one that is
tinged with the stigma associated with “trash” (Ferrell, 3). A first-of-its kind study found that bottle
deposit systems are most commonly used by the lowest wage earners, and that the income they
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make from the process is therefore very significant (Ashenmiller) However, it also has become
apparent through these interviews that these social services were unintended consequences of
bottle deposit systems, structurally inferior to environmental and economic goals. Several recent
changes in states systems are being conducted without much consideration of the needs of these
kinds of users, especially the unhoused. This is discussed in greater detail later in this research.
Waste and recycling is often the end step of the consumer cycle. Because of this, it is highly
difficult to obtain accurate data and information about the details of the recycling and garbage
industry, especially if these systems get linked into the international trade of waste (Minter, i). The
recent book Junkyard Planet by Minter provides some limited insight into this ever-changing
industry that’s controlled by the global market forces, but more up-to-date information is shared
regularly by ISRI, the Institute for Scrap Recycling Industries Inc. Extraction of resources for
manufacturing of materials such as PET plastic, aluminum, and glass can be a highly carbon and
time-intensive process. Aluminum in particular requires the mining and extraction of bauxite,
which is a mineral compound that is frequently removed with strip mining methods in many
developing countries and then is smelted at the expense of the health and safety of workers, local
people and the environment (Auty, 143; O’Connor, 75). While the pressure to export waste out of
a developed country like the United States is powerful, it is also highly motivated by the reality of
a powerful, magnetizing force of the market from places such as China. van Beukering writes
about the growing demand for plastic products worldwide, and China’s consequent need to import
existing plastics in order to supplement its insufficient domestic primary plastic production
industry. This research will focus specifically on the impacts of the imported plastic recycling
industry in Wen’an County, China.
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Chapter 3
Comparative Research Methods
My research is performed on the scale of analysis of the state for all stages of comparison.
This more macro level of analysis is informed both by primary interviews, policy study, and
relevant scholarly research. With ten bottle bill systems enacted in the country currently, this
research is more intensive than extensive in its scope of study (Landman, 29). The four case studies
were chosen in order to have the findings more grounded in its specific state context and to overall
maintain a lower level of abstraction upon the research (Landman, 24).
The dependent variable in this study is the political outcome of either the passage or defeat
of bottle bill legislation. From there, the quality of its result is considered and compared between
states through nine major independent variables and consideration of the state’s socio-political
setting. This type of analysis is an empirical type of study, in which the research seeks to “establish
causal relationships between two or more concepts to explain observed phenomena” (Landman,
15). This is an inductive reasoning system that strives to explain results through the observation
of known facts
Comparative Research Design
Throughout this analysis I use a two-tiered comparative analysis system, diagrammed in
Figure 3.1. First, between the cases with “like” results (Oregon and Maine; Massachusetts and
Washington), I employ Most Different Systems Design, or MDSD. This form of comparison is
useful to explore the ways that independent variables influence how these quite contrasting pairs
of states from opposite sides of the country arrive at either their eventual passage or rejection of a
bottle bill system. This method of differential comparison “allows the researcher to distill out the
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common elements from a diverse set of countries that have greater explanatory power” (Landman,
29; Przeworski, 1970). The MDSD method is appropriate for this stage of my research because it
allows me to explore which factors between case studies were most influential in bringing the
states to the same ultimate conclusion of the dependent variable. It is for this reason that I paired
up the states of Oregon and Maine which have passed comprehensive bottle bill legislation, to
compare with the unfulfilled campaigns of Washington state’s attempts to pass a bottle bill in the
1970’s, and 1982, and the failed Massachusetts water bottle expansion of Issue 2 in 2014
(Spendelow, Ballotpedia).
Over all of the case study states with existing bottle bills I will employ Most Similar
Systems Design, or MSSD, to answer the question: why do similar state bottle bill laws on the
same issue result in varying results and impacts? This MSSD comparative method is based off of
J.S. Mill’s method of difference, and serves to identify key differentiating features among similar
systems “which account for the [different] observed political outcome” (Landman, 29). Further,
the geographic proximity of the pairs of Oregon and Washington, and Maine and Massachusetts,
respectively, helps add to the underlying similarity upon which this comparative system is based.
This MSSD technique will allow me to highlight specific differing results between case studies
that relate back to the classifications and indicators that are explained throughout this chapter.
Figure 3.1 visually depicts the analytical trajectory of my Research Design.
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Figure 3.1

Independent Variables for Comparison
I impose several categories upon the bottle bill policies explored as case studies. These
classifications will largely fall upon the mechanisms that are outlined in the bottle bill legislation
itself. Figure 6.1, in Chapter 6 details most of the considered indicators. The variables and
indicators used in this research include the system’s policy administration, sense of state
environmental ethos, ownership of unredeemed deposit funds, handling fee price, method of
passage, social services as a form of alternative income, deposit price, net oppositional funding
against the bottle bill, strength of the supporting coalition, and the majority political party of the
time. Several other variables that are considered in research cannot be explained or described so
neatly into the cells of a table because they are more contextually based. These include the use of
bottle deposit systems as a social service and alternative income method, as well as the unique
situation of political and historical events that frame the way a state interacts with environmental
policy. The details of the context-specific importance of these variables are discussed further on a
case-by-case level in following chapters.
Classification of the influencing indicators that lead to passage or defeat of bottle bill
legislation is an important part of my methodology, but throughout this research I also compare
the overall results of these policies, in order to understand which types of policies can bring about
more or less effective trends in results. I will refer to these facts as either variables or indicators,
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because they display certain information about the policy mechanisms and effectiveness within a
state. These indicators may be either quantitative or qualitative.
Administration of the Bottle Bill
The first indicator is the administration and ownership of the system. This is an important
consideration because the administrator of the system is the one who that has both the
responsibility of and the power over the implementation the bottle bill system. While the
administrator holds a large determining role in the effectiveness and inner workings of the bottle
bill, it is also one that requires a substantial amount of funding to maintain the organization and its
employees. This variable is considered in the MSSD section, because all of the bottle bill systems
require very similar types of administration, and therefore allows for a consideration of the state’s
comparative effectiveness bottle bill administration.
Ownership of Unredeemed Deposits
This research will consider whether the bottle deposit system is state-owned or industry
owned. This research defines private as “any entity that is not a unit of government, including but
not limited to a corporation, partnership, company, nonprofit organization or other legal entity or
a natural person” and public as a government entity paid for by funds collected from the public
(Oregon Laws). Maine uses a state-owned system while Oregon uses a private, industry-owned
system. A significant aspect of this ownership is that the owner also retains the unredeemed
deposits from cans. As this is a figure in the millions of dollars, this is an important structural
aspect of the bottle bill and can influence whether or not certain groups will support or oppose
their initiative based on their access or exclusion from this pool of money. At the time of the
legislation’s passage or attempted passage within the case studies explored here, states either
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allocated their unredeemed deposits to the state for general uses, to the state for environmental
uses, or to private industries who were the initiators of the deposit.
Handling Fee
Another classification that differentiates the differing versions of bottle bill systems
explored here is the presence or absence of a handling fee. This is significant because the presence
of a handling fee puts an additional financial burden onto the beverage industry distributors, which
further incentivizes these stakeholders to resist to the implementation or to the expansion of a
bottle bill system. The case study states investigated here have handling fees that range from 0-4¢.
Mode of Passage
This category differentiates between whether the legislation was proposed as a bill within
the State Legislature or to the public on the ballot. Bills typically make their way through the state
legislature with elected officials as its champions who facilitate shepherding it through the various
committees, discussions, votes, and other bureaucratic steps until it is passed by a majority of both
the House and Senate bodies of the state. The second option in many states is through the process
of a Citizen’s Ballot Initiative. Any citizen who legally collects the requisite signatures and
completes the appropriate paperwork within a specific timeline can initiate a ballot initiative. After
the requirements are fully met and verified in all of the steps, a ballot initiative is put forward for
a vote for either passage or rejection by the citizens of the state. This categorization is significant
because it also defines who will vote on any updates or changes to the state’s beverage container
deposit system.

Deposit Price
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The price of the deposit per container affects the rate of return of the container. At the time
of the passage of the first bottle bill, the nickel deposit was the equivalent of 28¢ today
(Spendelow). Consequently, return rates were also higher in the past when the real value of the
nickel was higher than it is today. Therefore, the deposit price of containers is another variable
category that is considered when comparing case study states because this directly influences the
amount of container returned and the level of public participation in the program. Additionally,
this factor continues to be an important consideration because some states are considering a future
increase of their deposit price from a nickel to a dime.
Bottle Bill Opposition and Funding
The presence and strength of political opposition can be a powerful determinant in the
passage or defeat of bottle bill legislation. This analysis references the total quantitative spending
records that display evidence of political opposition against the bottle bill, and I also utilize the net
oppositional funding as a means of comparison. The net oppositional funding is the amount of
money spent by opposition in anti-bottle bill efforts, as compared to the amount of money spent
by the bill’s supporters. In these earlier bottle bill campaign, campaign funding was not as publicly
recorded, and so in many cases there are estimated ranges based off of several sources’ spending
records. This research will explore, and in some cases challenge the understanding that, “campaign
spending is the best predictor of the success of ballot measures” as well as legislative lawmaking
(McCuan, 77).

Majority Political Party
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The relative power of a political party in the state government is particularly important
when the bottle bill is considered through the state legislature. However, if the government is
divided or does not perceive the political climate as favorable to pass a bottle bill, in some cases it
can also recommend the bill to the state for a public vote, as it did in the case of Maine. Therefore,
the makeup of the state legislature can be significant with either method of passage. As is discussed
further in following chapters, the issue of environment has become polarized along party lines in
recent years. This wasn’t always the case, as the research displays through its case study
comparison. As bottle bill legislation is foremost considered to be a form of environmental policy,
(although it also has many other aspects) a consideration of the majority party in power in state
government can delineate the partisan or bipartisan levels of support for bottle bills. This can also
offer insight into the ways that political parties compromise or divide over issues such as
environmental policy.
Strength of Supporting Coalition
The size, variability, and tactics used by the supporting coalition for the bottle bill can hold
large influence over whether or not bottle bill legislation passes in a state. This research
describes this strength of support using quantitative data of the amount of funding that the group
was able to raise. Several forms of qualitative data are also referenced here, including a
consideration of which groups make-up the coalition, whether or not the coalition is multisectoral, their advertising and messaging tactics and volunteer participation
State Environmental Ethos
State environmental ethos is a difficult trait to qualify, as it depends largely upon personal
experience and one’s own subjectivity. However, there are some indicator variables that suggest
the presence of an environmental ethos, such as other pieces of environmental legislation and the
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number and activity of local environmental nonprofits. As an Oregonian myself, I hold some
deeper perceptions and understanding about the state culture there. However, I also recognize that
this is also a personal bias, and it likely impacts the way that Oregon is represented in my research.
In an attempt to understand the state environmental cultures in Maine, Massachusetts, and
Washington I largely rely upon the information given to me by my interviewees in the state. I
repeatedly heard references in Oregon and Maine to a strongly held cultural value for conservation
of natural beauty and environmentalism as an influential factor in successfully passing container
deposit legislation. I also reference secondary literature which considers the environmental culture
present in U.S. states, who cite Oregon and Maine as states who hold a powerful “environmental
imagination” (Judd, 2003; McCloskey, 2013). While this sense of an environmental ethos was not
explicitly referenced in my interviews about Washington and Massachusetts and the bottle bill, the
reasons for this omission are unknown. This does not mean that the culture of Washington and
Massachusetts is to not value their environment. Instead, this shows that that something is different
in the way that their bottle bill campaigns occurred within the context of their existing state
environmental ethos. This aspect is elaborated upon more in following chapters within the MDSD
analysis of the case studies.
Semi-Structured Interview Format
Many of the sources that I use for this research are primary sources from interviews that I
have conducted with people in the relevant political, economic, and activist spheres regarding this
bottle bill research. These semi-structured interviews were conducted in-person, over the phone,
or over email. Each interviewee has signed an IRB consent form prior to participating in an
interview, were given access to example questions that may be included in their interview, and
have the option of anonymity or to opt out of recording. These interviews are critical to my research
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because they better inform my analysis of the more qualitative indicators, as well as more behindthe-scenes information on campaigns and policy discussions. As Todd Landman writes, interviews
can be used to, “uncover a deeper level of information in order to capture meaning, process and
context (20). Additionally, there is a paucity of recent sources of research on the topic and these
interviews served as great resources to investigate the current functioning of bottle bills in the case
study states.
Secondary Sources
Newspaper articles and web sources are also valuable resources for my research. News
articles can provide insight into the local understanding and the opinions of its bottle bill system.
Articles were consulted from the local and state newspapers, for example, that describe the
statewide preparations for the bottle deposit system and highlight opinions of local citizens and
various stakeholders. Audio and video recordings of news reports and interviews are also very
helpful, because they provide a second look into a person’s firsthand experience with the issue.
These kinds of secondary sources offer valuable insight into the different stages of bottle bill
campaigns and allowed me to study the international impact of the recycling market, as I wasn’t
always able to interview people who were directly involved due to temporal, geographic, and
language constraints.
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Chapter 4
Surpassing the Bottleneck: Bottle Bill Campaigns in Oregon and Maine

This chapter will use the Most Different Systems Design, MDSD, to examine the different
variables that influenced the passage of Oregon and Maine’s bottle deposit legislation into law.
This is a valuable method of comparison because it displays a wide variety of successful political
techniques to pass environmental policy. This chapter will examine how the independent variables
listed in Figure 6.1 of Chapter 6 such as a state environmental ethos, political opposition, activity
of supporting coalitions (including political champions), support from the local business
community, and the bill’s specific financial structuring influenced the ultimate passage of bottle
deposit systems into law.
Oregon
Oregon was the first state in the country to pass container deposit legislation on the state
level, and it did so through its State Legislature. The idea to ban disposable containers was
originally suggested by Richard Chambers, who detested the rising amount of garbage that he
came across during his kayaking and hiking expeditions that spanned nearly the entirety of the
Oregon Coast (Walth, 255). Chambers reached out to friend, former fisherman, and State
Representative Paul Hanneman, who ultimately scrounged up other politicians to co-sponsor the
House Bill (HB) 1157 (Walth, 286). When the House Speaker found the legislation frivolous, it
was sent to the State and Federal Affairs Committee (SFAC), which was a committee that was
often said to serve as a “political graveyard” for legislation that the Speaker did not want to move
forward. However, Representative Roger Martin of Lake Oswego was the SFAC chair at the time
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and also one of the original co-sponsors of the bill. He gave the bottle bill a starting push by
granting it a public hearing.
The hearing was well-attended, and included many different types of testimony. An aide
to then-Governor Tom McCall testified to the Governor’s support of the idea, and farmers and
fishermen described the dramatic ways that litter was disrupting their work, property, livestock,
and way of life. On the other side of the issue, industry representatives from paper, glass, metal,
and beverage corporations cited evidence that beverage container made up a negligible portion of
roadside garbage, “and union lobbyists stepped in to spin gloomy tales of job losses in the glass
and metal industries if such a bill ever passed” (Walth, 261) The negative testimony left an impact,
and Hanneman shortly suggested a compromise that, “rather than ban returnables, the bill would
require a five-cent deposit as an incentive to return bottles and cans” (288). This newly proposed
system harkened back to the refillable container methods that bottling and brewing companies had
used prior to the industry’s nationwide shift to single-use bottles and cans.
This compromise kept HB 1157 alive but also its publicity from the hearing attracted
industry opponents to more directly to fight against the bill (McCloskey, 84). Beverage industry
lobbyists put heavy pressure through the committee SFAC Chairman Representative Martin to
ensure that the committee would not have the votes to send the bottle bill to the House floor.
Despite the industry pressure, Hanneman was able to convince a fellow outdoorsman Republican
Representative Carroll Howe to flip the vote in favor of forwarding the bill to the floor for a vote.
While the bill did not pass in the 1969 session, it had a hardy 23-37 showing in support. Hanneman
tried to reach out to Governor McCall, who had publicly supported the idea previously but the
Governor was silent on the issue except for rumor of a letter that circulated among state
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Republicans that McCall did not want a bottle bill to pass that session due to the presence of a
competing anti-littering initiative (Walth, 294).
In the waiting period for the 1971 session, an interim committee was established to conduct
preliminary studies and hearings on the issue of the bottle bill. This study would ultimately help
lead to the creation of the inaugural bottle bill law, the Oregon Beverage Container Act. The bottle
bill opponents still remained powerful and had ready access to resources and lobbyists, but the
bill’s supporters were also more organized and unified this time around. Other strategic
compromises were made such as the deposit price for small “stubby” beer bottles from breweries.
Lobbying for both sides intensified to unprecedented levels and Governor McCall and others
decried the oppositional campaign for its so-called, four D’s of “Distortion, Deceit, and Dollars,
equaling Defeat” (McCloskey, 86). These aspects of the campaign are explored in greater depth
later on, as the theme of these “four D’s” relate to all of the case studies investigated in the scope
of this research.
The Beverage Container Act was passed into law in 1971 with votes to spare in the House
of Representatives, but barely passed by the Oregon Senate with a vote of 16-14 in favor amid
frenzied lobbying. As the country’s inaugural bottle bill, this landmark passage of the Oregon
bottle bill sparked many other U.S. states to propose or refine their own forms of container deposit
legislation. This section will focus in more detail upon the specific aspects that made Oregon’s
bottle bill successfully pass into legislation with the intention of using similar variables to compare
with Maine in the second part of this chapter.
In Oregon specifically, the present ballot initiative process is recognized by many as one
of the easiest states to get a proposal onto the public ballot. This is largely because of the state’s
history of progressivism and early non-partisanship which supported putting issues of law to the
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public (Oregon Blue Book). Oregon also holds the current record for the highest total state ballot
initiatives attempted at 384 since the process was approved by the state legislature in 1902.
However, passing legislation on the public ballot can be quite difficult, requiring highly specific
strategies as are discussed in the case of Maine. The fact that the bottle bill was passed successfully
through the Oregon State Legislature and not on through the state’s oft-used Ballot Initiative
process appears due to several reasons. First, the consistent presence of strong champions that
supported the bill was incredibly important. These champions were Richard Chambers,
Representative Hanneman of Tillamook, and ultimately Governor McCall (Edwards, 54; Walth,
282). These champions were often willing and able to convince other elected officials of the bottle
bill, and were active advocates and coalition-builders both inside and outside of the capital (Walth,
261). It must be noted that Hanneman, McCall, and Chambers all identified as Republicans as well
as supporters of the bottle bill. The House of Representatives was controlled by Republicans at the
time, and had Rep. Hanneman not been a Republican as well, it is likely that his efforts might not
have been as well met (Hall).
Oregon as a state holds a strong ethos of environmental protection, largely due to its
historical dependence upon the timber and fishing industries. McCloskey poses that this sense of
environmental ethos within Oregon might be because “the idea of conservation and reserves for
that purpose are better understood in rural regions” (219). The 1970 census identified Oregon’s
population as 32.93% rural, and since the state Senate equally represents all districts with two
Senators, rural communities still maintained a large presence in the state government (U.S. Census
Bureau). Senator and author Richard Neuberger held the belief that, “those who farmed and
ranched the vast interior grasslands of the Pacific Northwest would never succumb to the mass
ideologies that seemed to dictate global order in the 1930s and 1940s. Their opinions, he insisted,
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reflected the ‘independence, freedom, and uniqueness of the majestic hinterland in which they
live” (Judd, 2). Even the state motto, “She flies with her own wings” uses elements of nature to
illustrate the “proud ability of Oregonians to be independent spirits” (Hall).
Oregon as a “frontier state” fashioned a culture that was also highly dependent upon the
land, and so incorporated ideas of environmental protection into its cultural ethos because its
economy depends so much upon the land.5 The utopian novel Ecotopia by Ernest Callenbach
recognizes this environmental identity of the Northwest bioregion in his reimagining of a seceded
Northwest that centers upon a society that is structured upon environmental sustainability. Today,
recreational hiking, hunting, fishing and boating are popular activities and the identity of Oregon
as “the leading environmental state” continues to largely be upheld through state and local policy
(McCloskey, xii).
Coalition building was also critical to the eventual successful passage of the Oregon bottle
bill. As broad as the issue is, the corresponding supporting coalition was consequently also quite
diverse in nature, consisting of environmental groups, local grocery stores, breweries, and even
the soda company Dr. Pepper (McCloskey, 85). Don Waggoner and the Oregon Environmental
Council (OEC), which remains a powerhouse in state environmental politics today, created a
subgroup within the organization titled “People Against Non-Returnables” (McCloskey, 84). This
group performed research, gave testimony, and several other kinds of lobbying activities that were
frequently successful in brokering game-changing compromises.

5

It is essential to recognize the presence of Native peoples of Oregon, and truly in every case study that is examined
in this study. The Chinook, Willamette, Umpqua, the Siletz and many more groups of indigenous peoples of Oregon
intricately incorporated the details of the northwest bioregion into their culture and conducted boating, hiking, and
hunting for their own cultural and survival purposes long before white Americans began creating their own sense of
“outdoorsiness.”
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The bottle bill also found unlikely allies in the shape of local grocers Fred Meyers and
Plaid Pantry. John Piacentini, the owner of convenience stores Plaid Pantry, launched his own
promotional bottle bill system in which he told people to return empty containers to any of his
stores to receive a penny per container in exchange (Spendelow). In the first two weeks of the
program the response was hugely positive, so much that the National Guard was called in to help
remove the estimated 150,000 cans that were returned to Plaid Pantries across the state. This
outpouring of support helped assuage the fears of grocery stores regarding the financial burden of
processing the returned beverage containers. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality Solid
Waste Analyst Peter Spendelow suggests that because these local stores like Fred Meyers and
Plaid Pantry had an invested stake in the state of Oregon, they supported it, “because they
understood the environmental aspects” and because they also as Oregonians wanted to reduce litter
(Spendelow).
Back in the state capitol of Salem, lobbying was intense on both sides of the bottle bill
issue, and there were even “charges of attempted bribery” that arose (McCloskey, 86). The
acknowledgment of this bill as a landmark opportunity with the potential to set a precedent
throughout the country added further to the so-called “poisonous” climate surrounding the bill in
the state government. Lobbyists for the metal industries offered $5,000 in campaign contributions
for any senator who would vote against the bill (Walth, 296). In fact, it got to such high levels of
hostility that the Attorney General and the American Organization for Industry (AOI) publicly
decried the candor of the oppositional campaign (McCloskey, 86).
The final product of the bottle bill was shaped through Hanneman’s and Waggoner’s
willingness to compromise with the Oregon business community. The first major compromise
occurred after the first Congressional hearing on the proposed bill, when the bill transformed from
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the form of a ban on non-returnables to the deposit-scheme in response to industry concerns posed
in testimony of the impact of a disposable bottle ban on jobs (Walth, 261). As Hanneman proposed
this deposit amendment to the committee, he noted that “it was hardly radical, as it only required
brewers and bottlers to operate as they had a few years before” (261). After all, the onset of
throwaway containers was still relatively new and even smaller bottling companies still had the
institutional memory to facilitate a refillable system.
Hanneman and other advocates of the bottle bill recognized that the smaller companies in
the brewing and soda industries were under a lot of stress due to heightened levels of competition
to take advantage of the price advantages gained by using single-use containers. Breweries
nationwide were forced to consolidate or go out of business, resulting in a loss of about 27,000
jobs (Walth, 258). At the same time, Oregon was forming its culture of independent breweries in
alongside the debate over the bottle bill, so it was essential and highly tactical to include these
stakeholders in the conversation (Woodward; McCloskey, 85). The OEC met with Bill Wessinger
of the Blitz-Weinhard brewery and agreed on a compromise of a reduced deposit price of two cents
on small “stubby” brown beer bottles in exchange for his support of the bottle bill. This addendum
also had the result of standardizing the size of all Oregon-based beer bottles to these 11oz bottles
for which “all the brewer had to do was put the bottle through a washing machine, wash off the
existing labels on that, fill it with beer, slap their own label on it and then send them off”
(Spendelow). This “brewer’s exemption” and its efficiency-promoting standardization of bottles
helped discredit the opposition’s argument that the bottle bill is “anti-business,” an argument still
commonly made today.
Another critical part of the reason why Oregon’s Beverage Container Recovery Act passed
in 1971 is that it was specifically crafted to be privately-owned and not involve any public money.
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Initially this meant that bottlers and distributors joined together into several cooperative groups to
administrate the bottle bill, but now all of the distributors have joined together to form a single
cooperative corporation with a 99% membership rate for Oregon bottlers and distributors (OBRC,
Bertges).
Oregon also never proposed a handling fee as a part of its container deposit legislation. The
absence of additional costs per container made the law less economically threatening for
distributors, bottling companies, and pickup agencies. Ultimately, this was made possible because
the funds from unredeemed containers, a fund of around $16 million dollars per year, is almost
entirely owned by the distributors themselves6 (Bottle Bill Task Force Report, 14). “Whatever
profits the co-op generates are divided among the 80 beverage distributors that own the Oregon
Beverage Recycling Cooperative” (Thomas). While, as will continue to be discussed, it is unduly
apparent that there was a presence of strong opposition against the Oregon bottle bill, it can be
argued that the fight for passage would have been even more highly contested if the law was
constructed to include more out-of-pocket costs for businesses in the beverage industry. Though it
can never be known for sure, this slightly more pro-business structure may have made the
difference, as the vote in the Senate was as close as it possibly could be and still be in favor of
passage, 16-14.
Overall, Oregon’s bottle bill was successfully passed into law in 1971 due to a combination
of the presence of committed legislative champions across party lines, a powerful state
environmental ethos, a strong coalition of supporters--including local businesses, and through
repeated considerations, consultations and compromises with stakeholder in the beverage business

6

Some funds are allocated to the Oregon Liquor Control Commission for their partial administrative role

Bluffstone, 40

community. This research now looks to the state of Maine to compare the different ways that a
state can successfully pass container deposit legislation.
Maine
Maine was the third state in the U.S. to pass container deposit legislation, following Oregon
and Vermont. The originally proposed legislation LD 931/1888, An Act to Require Returnable
Beverage Containers, was put forward in the regular legislative session of 1975, but was rejected
in the House of Representatives (Legislative History, 2013). As is discussed later on, there was a
significant amount of lobbying on this issue, particularly in opposition to the bill.
The topic was posed again in the 1976 Special Legislative Session, largely thanks to a Joint
Order from the Natural Resources Committee requiring a study of solid waste (House 3/24/76,
641). It was cited that of this thirteen-person Committee, eleven “felt that a returnable beverage
container provision should be included in a comprehensive solid waste bill” (Senate, 3/26/76, 742).
Such a bill was proposed in the Maine House of Representatives in the form of H.P. 2090/L.D.
2249, “An Act to Improve Solid Waste Management” (House, 3/24/76, 641). It went through a
series of amendments crafted by both the Committee on Taxation and the Maine Senate, and there
was significant debate about whether a bottle bill should be included in the act--especially after it
was only slightly adjusted after it the Senate rejected it in the previous session (Legislative
History).
It was suggested on March 24, 1976 by proponent of the bill Representative McKernan of
Bangor that the proposed bottle deposit system “is an opportunity to allow the people to vote on
something that they are very concerned about and that they favor” (House, 3/24/76, 641). This
sentiment was echoed in the Senate by Senator Collins of Knox in a floor statement that, “this
[referendum provision] not only has a value involving a judgement but a value in educating our
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citizens to the importance of solid waste management” (Senate, 3/26/76, 746). While this action
was framed by the state government as an attempt to include the public in state politics, many
aspects suggest that due to intense lobbying the Maine Legislature decided to “kick the can further
down the road” in order to pass on the bottle bill as someone else’s problem (ME Audubon - Ginn).
Eventually, HB 2090 was approved by the Maine Legislature on April 1st and 2nd, 1976,
with the specific provision for the bottle bill system to be determined by the people of Maine
through a public referendum. The House voted 36-103 in favor of passing the bill and forwarding
it to the Senate, where it then passed easily and was sent on to the Governor’s office with an
approving vote of 26-4 (House, 4/1/76, 890; Senate, 4/2/76, 925). Then, just the section of the bill
regarding the potential for the creation of bottle bill system was put forward to the voters, who
widely approved it on Election Day 1976 (Ballotpedia, Maine Minimum Bottle Refund). The
Maine bottle bill system was implemented on June 1, 1978, and its original process is outlined in
the following figure.

Figure 4.1.
Criner, 1991, pg
19.
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Figure 4.1 displays the cycle of Maine’s deposit system, and illuminates the roles or
burdens that each stakeholder or groups takes on throughout the process. One aspect that this
diagram fails to include is that not all recycled material stays in the region and neatly goes back to
the distributor who initially sold it to the recycler. Rather, once the glass, plastic, or aluminum is
sold to the recycler, those materials are sold for reuse to the highest bidder. In some cases, this
may include exporting the product internationally.
Like Oregon, Maine also has a powerful environmental ethos rooted deeply within its
culture as a state. After the Second World War, Maine’s economy fell behind the rest of the
nation’s, as it was fairly marginalized from the rest of the country and depended largely upon its
local economy (Judd, xii). This attributed to a growing sense of individualism in Maine that was
largely rooted in the land. One poet describes a vision in which Maine was separated from the rest
of the country by “blow[ing] up the bridges to the mainland...and return to the free life, the life
without fences” (Judd, 1).
However, the state’s burgeoning tourism industry indirectly allowed for the incorporation
of these environmental ideals into the politics of the state of Maine through support of local
beautification ordinances and a “Keep Maine Scenic” government program (16). Current Maine
Senator and former Governor Angus King who was a lobbyist for the National Resource Council
of Maine during the passage of the bottle bill says that, “As a tourist-oriented state whose major
attraction is its natural beauty, we are very aware of the contribution of the deposit system in
keeping our roadsides clean. The deposit law has had a positive effect in fostering over 1,600 jobs
with annual wages of $22.8 million at local redemption centers throughout the state”
(Bottlebill.org).
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More anecdotally, in an interview Maine native Sarah Lakeman also expressed that the
bottle bill is seeded deeply into the state’s culture and that if in her work at an environmental nonprofit “You mention, hey, they’re trying to mess with the bottle bill and everyone’s like no way
it’s not going to happen. It’s a part of our culture here I think people just are proud of it, and it’s
what we do and...it would be really hard to go against that” (Lakeman). Further, Beth Milligan
mentioned that upon moving to Maine from elsewhere that she noticed, “there’s a lot of hunters,
there’s a lot of fisherman, they like to snowmobile...There’s a really deep appreciation for the
outdoors...and I think that’s the culture and it’s a generational thing that’s passed down.”
In Maine, there is a popular public ballot system for citizens to directly vote bills into law.
As was outlined earlier, this bill went through a combination of both of the two political options
for passing legislation because it was first passed by the Maine Legislature specifically to be posed
as a referendum to the people. The Maine Returnable Container Beverage Law passed with 57.8%
of the vote for and 42.2% against on November 2, 1976.
Proposed legislation on the public ballot is often more present in the public consciousness
than bills in the State Legislature, because there is a necessity to get the state’s citizens to care,
about the issues, decide their opinion on it, and physically get themselves out to vote (Ellis, 2002).
In fact, Senator Berry from Cumberland states during a Senate discussion that, “by the time this
plebiscite takes place everybody in the State of Maine is going to be so well informed on all the
features of the thing that they will know more about the bill than we do now when we vote on it”
(Senate 3/29/76, 791).
This sense of public political discussion leaves more work for the interest groups involved
in campaigns as they strive to reach the wider public rather than the several hundred elected
officials who can all be found predictably within the state capitol. However, with campaigns comes
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a necessity for fundraising, and studies often show that whichever side has the most money in a
political campaign will come out the victor due to their superior access to lobbyists, advertising,
and hired campaign staff (Gourevitch, 57; McCuan, 52). Maine, may prove an exception to this
rule, as is discussed later in the chapter.
By 1976 two bottle bills had already been passed and one in Washington had been defeated.
Both supporters and opponents of the Maine Returnable Container Beverage Law could then
reference and learn from these experiences to help frame their efforts in Maine. The coalition
opponents of the Maine bottle referendum in 1976 consisted of brewers, bottlers, canners, material
industries, soft-drink companies, and container manufacturers (AP, 1978; Bowers).
The presence and level of political opposition is a significant factor in whether legislation
passes, or does not pass. In 1975 during the first consideration of container deposit legislation in
the state of Maine, Senator Reeves of Kennebec cited that just the television and newspaper
advertising for the bottle bill opposition amounted to “some fifteen to twenty thousand dollars” in
an attempt to sway just the votes of Maine’s elected officials (Senate, 3/22/76, 575). During the
1976 Special Legislative Session, the level of oppositional spending is unclear. However, the
records of governmental sessions include an accusatory statement from Senator Collins toward
Senator Katz, who had suddenly changed his vote to oppose the bottle bill. Collins charged that
Katz was now in the pocket of the anti-bottle bill coalition when he said, “it is obvious that the
lobby for the liquor industry and the soft drink industry has been diligently at work overnight”
(Senate, 3/30/76, 824). These examples display the intensity of the anti-bottle bill coalition.
In the five months following the legislative referral of the law to the public these opponents
launched an all-out attack against the referendum. The figures for the funding vary slightly, but
most estimate that these opponents spent between $350,000-$500,000 on their anti-bottle bill
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campaign (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn; Bowers). Typically, this wielding of such a heavy financial
weapon can deal a fatal blow to a container deposit system campaign. However, evidence shows
that in Maine this attempt may have backfired. Due to the state’s small population of just over one
million in 1976, the anti-bottle bill techniques of the opposing coalition have been described as a
“complete saturation,” with advertisements on all types of media, billboards, bumper stickers, and
pamphlets everywhere (Bowers).
As a state with a small population and with five other issues on the ballot that fall, William
Ginn of the Maine Audubon Society says that despite the bitterness of the political battle, “It was
overkill...People got fed up with this show of muscle” (Ginn, 2005; Bowers). This feeds back into
Maine’s cultural individualism of practicality, love for the outdoors, and a dislike of being pushed
around by big money (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn). A study of Maine campaigns and elections notes
that in many instances “in Maine ballot measure campaigns, having more resources than your
opponent is not a guarantor of victory...it’s not the independent variable it’s cracked up to be”
(Potholm, 158). Even today, Ginn notes, Maine is an anomaly in the nation as data shows that
“Mainers” tend to vote by “conscience” more frequently than it votes for the side with more
money” (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn). The coalition in support of the bottle bill spent somewhere
between $29,000 and $40,000 on their campaign, which was about ten times less than what the
anti-bottle bill coalition spent (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn, Bowers).
While the overwhelming nature of the anti-bottle coalition seems to have resulted in
overwhelming and frustrating many Maine voters, a lot of credit also has to be given to the
supporting coalition and its leaders. This group consolidated themselves under the name,
“Maine Citizens for Returnable Containers” and was largely made up of environmental groups,
including Maine Audubon, the Natural Resource Council of Maine (NRCM), and the Keep Maine
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Scenic Committee (Maine’s Bottle Bill, 5). Additionally, the bottle bill received support from local
politicians, both Democrat and Republican who were campaigning at the time (AP, 1976).
This larger coalition of supporters was quite effective in organizing large amounts of
volunteers, and in many ways conducted a type of grassroots organizing effort before that term
entered popular political dialogue. Ginn says that this coalition, “fielded as much money in the
forms of volunteers out on the sides of roads as our opposition did with their financing and their
slick ads.” He credits the referendum’s large margin of victory to this “extraordinary volunteer
effort” (ME Audubon - Bill Ginn). It also seems that Ginn himself, then the assistant director of
Maine Audubon, was also very active. Sometimes speaking with to five audiences a day, Ginn
travelled more than 7,000 miles around the state in the fall of 1976 (Adams, 2015). The presence
of committed organizers and a large-scale mobilization of passionate volunteers were a large factor
in passing the Maine bottle bill initiative.
An important factor in a container deposit system is the means of collecting payment to
cover the costs of the system’s procedures. In the case of Maine, the costs for running a redemption
center are covered by a handling fee, which must be paid by the distributors who initiate the
deposit. These distributor groups are often household beverage company brands, including CocaCola, Pepsi, Gatorade and Nestlé. Unsurprisingly, these groups are very opposed to the presence
of a handling fee because they are working on large scales of collection, in which a one-cent
handling fee on average resulted in a $310 fee per ton in 1977 (Resource Conservation Committee,
159).
Since the original passage of the legislation, the handling fee has been increased from 1¢
in 1976 to 3.5¢ or 4¢7 today (BottleBill.org). This increasing price continues to be a thorn in the
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side of beverage distributors, but pits them against the small business owners who run any of the
800 container redemption centers across the state who depend upon the handling fee to cover their
costs (Lakeman). As local businesses employing around 1,000 people, the redemption center sector
has a vested interest in protecting and increasing the handling fee, as business costs increase over
time. The redemption center owners also still remain highly involved in efforts to defend the bottle
bill from attacks from the opposition, as happened in 2014 (Lakeman).
At the time of the original bottle bill’s passage in 1976 the language of the legislation
awarded the deposits to the “sole initiators of the deposits,” the distributors (Criner, 21).
Distributors also typically pass on the additional handling fee to the consumers through the product
price. Therefore, if containers are unredeemed and thus do not require handling, distributors at this
time could gain a six-cent profit per container. Unredeemed deposits were very profitable for the
distributors under the original bottle bill, a reality which contrastingly conflicts with the underlying
goal of a high return rate for containers.
Partially because of this counterproductive incentive, Maine changed the final ownership
of unredeemed container deposits. It is currently the case that if containers included under the
bottle bill go unredeemed, the 5¢ or 15¢ profit either returns to the state into the Maine General
Fund, or to the bottle manufacturers who are part of a “comingling agreement,” which was
established later on, in 2003. Comingling is defined by the Maine Department of Agriculture to be
when, "two or more initiators of deposit (distributors) of beverage containers for which they have
initiated deposits to be commingled by dealers and redemption centers. The advantages of
comingling agreements allow for the comingling of beverage containers by like product group,
(beer, wine, spirits and soft drinks etc.) material, and size” (Maine Dept. of Agriculture, 4). This
agreement encourages comingling, which allows for more high quality recyclable material to be
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sold to the recycling industry, but also creates greater uncertainty in the deposit amount returned
for each distributor.
Sarah Lakeman of the NRCM noted that the large amount of money collected from
unredeemed deposits in the state of Maine today is largely “new news” to the state’s current group
of legislators. Lakeman said that she didn’t “think they [Maine’s elected officials] realized how
much money was essentially going to the state” from the unredeemed deposits, which in 2014
amounted to about $1.8 million dollars. Manufacturers who are members of the co-mingling
agreement are not presently required to report how much money they receive from unredeemed
deposits under the bottle bill, but it is estimated to be at least double the amount that the state
receives, approximately $3.6 million (Lakeman). This is an internally built-in compromise that
provides monetary benefits to some manufacturing groups, who would otherwise likely be a
staunch opponent.
The fact that the bottle bill in Maine’s bottle bill began in the legislature and was referred
to the public through referendum greatly changed which tactics were most critical in passing the
proposed legislation into law. In Maine, there is also a strong, pre-existing environmental ethos
that greatly supported the ideas of litter-reduction--especially as a state whose growing tourism
industry depends upon its rural, and rustic beauty. Maine holds a unique cultural value for
individualism due to its post-war economic isolation and heavily rural population (US Census,
1970). This sense of individualism remained strong in the face of big money contributions from
bottle bill opponents and ultimately led to a significant victory of the Maine Returnable Beverage
Container Law on the public referendum.
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Comparing Oregon and Maine
Oregon and Maine both hold strong core environmental values as a part of their state
cultures. This common disgust with the new phenomenon of litter in rural and beach communities
who are dependent on agriculture and tourism created the initial support needed for container
deposit legislation to be feasible. The two states on different sides of the country then split off into
two paths that exemplify different ways to pass bottle bill legislation.
Bottle bill initiatives in both states were met with significant political opposition from a
well-funded coalition of beverage-related industries and grocers. However, bottle bill advocates in
Oregon and Maine approached this obstacle in different ways. Oregon’s strong political champions
in the State Legislature worked with supporting activists to broker compromises with key players
within the beverage industry, most notably local brewers. The oft-made argument that container
deposit legislation is “anti-business” was softened in the case of Oregon because of these efforts
to compromise with the local business community, and due to the unwavering support from several
other local businesses whose leaders personally approved of the environmental goals of the bottle
bill. In Maine, the setting of the bottle bill legislation on the public referendum required different
techniques. The supporting coalition was largely made up of Maine environmental groups, and
under their leadership they organized a mass mobilization of volunteers and an outreach to all parts
of the sparsely populated state. Underpinning this success was Maine’s culturally-rooted distrust
of “big money” and consequent frustration with the incessant harassment from bottle bill
opposition.
Certain structural aspects of these two bottle bill legislations were also important in
allowing their passage into law. In Oregon, the absence of a handling fee and the ultimate
ownership of the unredeemed deposits by the distributors was a critical point of compromise to
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the beverage industry. Any inclusion of additional costs to the beverage industry and
manufacturers likely would have increased oppositional lobbying, and since the bill only passed
the Senate 16-14, any further lobbying might have resulted in the defeat of the bottle bill. Maine’s
original one-cent handling fee was highly opposed by the opposing coalition, and it was argued
that this handling fee was detrimental to businesses--including “Mom ‘n Pop” local stores (House
3/24/1976, 624). However, the argument that the bottle bill was anti-business was largely
overshadowed by the perceived opportunity posed through establishing redemption centers in the
state. This created a new local jobs sector and it was generally accepted that the handling fee was
the necessary means to pay for these systems.
These are not the only ways to successfully pass bottle bill legislation at the state level, as
the presence of eight other bottle deposit systems around the country clearly demonstrate.
However, these case studies from opposite coasts do exemplify the critical aspects that have the
potential to influence a successful passage of container deposit legislation. Next, this research
explores two case studies of defeated bottle bills in order to discover pivotal aspects that encourage
the defeat of proposed bottle deposit legislation.
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Chapter 5
How to Beat a Bottle Bill: Comparative Case Studies of Washington and Massachusetts

This chapter will use the MDSD comparative methodology to investigate how and why
these two states failed to pass bottle deposit legislation. This chapter will explain how the specific
situations and variables facing Massachusetts and Washington created incompatible settings for
deposit systems to pass into law. The major variables in consideration in these case studies include
the handling fee, anti-bottle bill oppositional messaging and tactics, the attempted method of
passage onto the public ballot, and the simultaneous presence of alternative litter-reduction
systems. These variables are significant because identification of the tactics that have defeated
bottle bills in the past can help frame future attempts at passing forms of environmental policy
when facing similar barriers.
This will consider Washington’s three attempts in 1970, 1979, and 1982 at passing a bottle
bill in conjunction. This combination is because in these three attempted ballot initiatives build off
of each other in many ways, experience similar barriers to legislative passage, and lead to the
ultimate inability to pass container deposit legislation in the state. The Massachusetts case study
addresses the existing bottle bill system as important contextual information, but the focus of the
section is on the 2014 Question 2 campaign. This was a ballot initiative campaign to expand the
bottle bill to add other updates to the state’s bottle deposit system.
As was displayed in Figure 2.1, bottle bills as ballot initiatives versus bottle bills proposed
in the legislature have very different levels of success. Here, both Washington and Massachusetts
attempted to use the ballot as the method to pass bottle bill legislation. However, unique challenges
face ballot initiatives that do not also face legislatively proposed bills. Direct democratic initiatives
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have fewer structurally incorporated protections to protect from outside interference with the
democratic process than the structure of legislative lawmaking (McCuan, 53) The United States
political system is dependent upon checks and balances, and some argue that the design of direct
democracy is in many ways a power limitation upon representative government. However, since
the professionalization of politics through the use of pollsters, paid canvassers, and media
consultants has recently become normalized, it is now questionable how accessible the path of
direct democracy is for the average citizen (McCuan,52).
Oregon, as laid out in the previous chapter, did not face these exact kinds of challenges.
This is largely because working through the state legislature is often more removed from the public
eye, and because the process of committees drafting and editing legislation allows for increased
opportunities to develop supporting champions through politically-achieved compromises.
However, Maine did experience similar kinds of challenges when the bottle bill was on the ballot
there.
Washington
Robert H. Keller, Jr was a History and Indian Law and Policy professor at Western
Washington University in Bellingham, WA in 1969. A class project in his class was to reduce litter
in a local park, and his students struggled to accomplish their litter reduction goals with signage,
punitive fines, or volunteer clean-ups. Together, Professor Keller and his students referenced a
previous petition and the Oregon proposal to collect signatures and submit an Initiative to the
People to propose a statewide deposit on beverage containers on the public ballot (Schmidt, 2010).
Initiative 256, Washington Ban on Non-Refundable Beverage Containers, was put to the
people on the 1970 public ballot. This is before the first bottle bill in Oregon was passed, so this
first initiative was largely in uncharted territories. It failed by a margin of 51.28% against with
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48.725% in support (Ballotpedia, Initiative 256). After this loss at the ballot the Washington State
University newspaper commented that its defeat, “reflects the apparent apathy and lack of concern
for natural resources on the part of the voters” (Williams, 1970). Just a few months later, Oregon
passed the nation’s inaugural bottle bill. Inspired by this new market-incentivized form of
environmental legislation, states across the country began proposing – with many passing – their
own versions of bottle deposit legislations. In 1971 the Washington State Legislature, however,
passed the, “Waste Reduction, Recycling, and Model Litter Control Act” as “an alternative to
beverage container deposits” (Litter Laws, WA Gov). This law was ratified by Washington voters
in 1972 to study litter patterns, create a task force on the issue, and to enforce litter penalties.
With several successful campaigns across the U.S., bottle bill proponents prepared to
present a second bottle bill on the Washington ballot in 1979. However, this proposal was defeated
by an even greater margin than before, with 57.28% opposed and only 42.37% in support. By the
time that a deposit system was proposed again in 1982, it was easily beaten with more than 70%
in opposition to the initiative. This period of the 1980s was also highly anti-regulatory at many
levels of government and the beverage industry implemented a “Vote No” campaign against bottle
bills that largely stifled the spread of the legislation across the nation (Schmidt, 103). Just four of
eleven bottle bill initiatives passed into law during the Reagan administration.
Figure 2.1 displays that several states have tried to pass deposit laws multiple times.
However, only Massachusetts and California have been successful, while Colorado and
Washington have found it impossible to pass bottle bill legislation in later attempts. In 1982 the
Washington D.C. group Environmental Action tried to coordinate bottle bill initiative campaigns
that were on their second or third try for passage, largely unsuccessfully (Schmidt, 101).
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While an exploration of why certain states are able to pass bottle bills into law after the
first attempt and others weren’t entails a different research project, it does show that it is difficult
to pass bottle bill legislation on the second attempt. Therefore, the fact that Washington attempted
not twice but thrice to pass bottle bill legislation displays the declining chances of the bill’s
passage. The initiative results over time also display a corresponding decrease in the public’s
favorability for the bottle bill in Washington state. Between 1970 and 1979 support for the bottle
bill fell almost 6% and dropped nearly 13% between 1979 and 1982.
Triumph of Innovation: The Supporting and Opposing Coalitions
Professor Keller’s class completed the final proposal in mid-April of 1970, which is
typically too late to begin a campaign for a ballot in a November election. However, David Schmidt
writes that Keller’s students were excited and impatient to work on the campaign and Professor
Keller agreed to submit the initiative petition on their behalf despite the unideal timing (96).
Though the coalition was substantial and included the Washington Environmental Council, The
Sierra Club, and even local banks who conducted bottle collection demonstrations8, this campaign
was still left with just six months to convince the public to support the bottle bill. However, the
proponents still garnered significant support because of the national environmental energy that
was sweeping the country. The coalition collected 188,102 signatures over eight weeks, which was
the record number of petition signatures ever gathered in Washington at the time (Schmidt, 97).
Interestingly, there was not a huge expectation of significant opposition from the beverage
industry against bottle bills, because these companies too were riding high on the environmental
movement’s popularity and tailored marketing tactics to include ideas of recycling and reuse.
Therefore, it was a relatively easy transition for the proponents of the Washington Bottle Bill to
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build off of these sentiments and ask questions directly from the environmental pamphlets of
beverage companies such as Coca-Cola’s rhetorical question, “Wouldn’t you rather borrow [a]
bottle than buy it” (Schmidt, 97). However, as shall be discussed, the beverage industries were not
passive in the issue of bottle bills.
Although there was a poll less than a month before the election that said that voters
supported the initiative by 76%, ultimately the supporting groups were outflanked by a superior
messaging tactic (Schmidt, 99). Using a “carrot and stick” approach, the industry presented an
alternative litter law just two months before the election, and also spread the message that a bottle
bill would be bad for local businesses and increase unemployment. As Keller and his supporters
went to lobby the unions on the premise that a bottle bill creates more jobs than a throwaway
system, “they found that the industry had gotten to the unions first and convinced the retail clerks
that they would be forced into an unwanted role as garbage collectors, that beverage sales would
plummet, that producers and distributors of drinks in throwaway containers would be forced to
shut down, and that unemployment would worsen” (Schmidt, 98). Several of these arguments are
incorrect or exaggerated, but they still had the intended effect of decreasing support for the bottle
bill.
These distributors, corporations, and grocers then successfully rebranded themselves as a
Pro-Litter Law coalition rather than an anti-bottle bill coalition. The following year, a version of
this law passed in the Washington State Legislature. This legislation is more favorable to bottlers,
distributors, beverage companies, and grocers because it focuses on implementing litter fines, fees,
and other methods at the consumer or “litter-er” instead of at the level of industry. Additionally,
the minimal taxes that are paid by the beverage industry to fund this program just make up 2% of
the taxes, while many other industries are required to pay far larger contributions.
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The argument for a Litter Law is that it reduces required actions from consumers and
industry, addresses total litter rather than just beverage containers, and is not economically
disruptive. In response, bottle bill supporters often point out that Litter Law proponents are
typically deeply involved with those whose profits would suffer under a bottle bill, as shown by
the testimony delivered at a Congressional Hearing. Nearly all of those who mentioned the
Washington Litter Law favorably in their testimony were themselves members of the beverage
industry in some way (Beverage Container Reuse and Recycling Hearings). Additionally, there is
a great amount of discussion about the comparative level of effectiveness between Litter Laws
such as Washington’s and bottle deposit systems. Proponents of the Model Litter Law maintain
that studies show the law cut litter by 66%, but bottle bill proponents have been skeptical of the
validity of this figure because of controversy over the starting amount of litter and the methods of
counting--by piece or by volume. (Beverage Container Reuse and Recycling Hearings). Seven
years after the passage of Washington’s Model Litter Law the former Governor was quoted calling
roadside litter, “a disgrace. The worst I've ever seen it” (Litter Taxes).
The opposition to the proposed bottle bills on the Washington state ballot initially began at
a high level and continued to increase over the years. The opposition is primarily made up of
beverage corporations, distributors and the grocers. These groups oppose the bottle bill because it
adds additional responsibilities, and consequent additional costs to their companies through the
required compliance with a state bottle bill system (Spendelow).
The oppositional tactics to the proposed bottle bills in Washington were made possible by
their large pool of anti-bottle bill funding. The anti-bottle bill coalition hired one of the most
renowned Seattle political advertising firms to consult on how to beat the initiative. With this
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professional advice, the oppositional coalition launched an intense advertising effort against
Initiative 256 (Keller, 1970).
This coalition was especially effective in Washington’s later campaigns because they had
time to refine and adjust their techniques (Schmidt, 101). It is estimated that in 1979 and 1989,
respectively, the opposition spent $856,000 and $717,951 to fight against the Washington bottle
bill (Bottle Bill Initiative Spending Records). Peter Spendelow worked on the bottle bill campaign
in 1979 and 1982 and notes that, “the industry was very good at picking an issue and creating their
own narrative and with lots of money they could get that narrative out.” In the case of Washington,
this money was also used to fund highly effective and original oppositional techniques.
In Washington where grocers were almost universally aligned with the beverage industry
to oppose the bottle bill, the grocery store was a very valuable location to spread the anti-bottle
bill message. Spendelow describes that the anti-bottle bill coalition attached small tags to each sixpack of cans or bottles that said, “if measure 61 passes, this six-pack will cost you 55¢ more.”
While this information is incorrect, it was ultimately effective in confusing the consumers about
the pricing and functioning of the proposed system. Additionally, stores printed “‘Vote No’
messages on grocery bags, had clerks put ‘Vote No’ leaflets into them, and set up ‘Vote No’
advertising displays in stores (Schmidt, 101). These types of techniques were very effective
because they were placed in high-traffic locations that directly related to the issue on the ballot.
In Washington state there is some sense of a state culture of environmentalism, especially
regarding land conservation efforts and the outdoor tourism industry (Catton, 1997). However, it
is significant to note that here this sense of state ethos was not powerful enough to overcome the
anti-bottle bill coalition as it was in the cases of Oregon and Maine. In Washington, it was not just
opponent spending and advertising that were going against the bottle bill, but also the inappropriate
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timing of the supporting coalition, compounding presence of alternative legislation, and the
multiple attempts to pass the bill on the public ballot that made it essentially impossible to pass
container deposit legislation in the state. Further, as time passed after the first attempt to pass a
bottle bill in 1970 the industry refined its oppositional tactics and became increasingly more
effective. A comparison of the case studies of Washington and Massachusetts will continue to
expand on the different ways that bottle deposit legislation can be defeated on the public ballot.
Massachusetts
The original bottle bill passed in Massachusetts in 1982 after one failed attempt in 1976. It
was ultimately passed the second time from the State Legislature’s override of the Governor’s
veto. These were highly contested campaigns, including heavy lobbying and unprecedented
spending budgets (Adams, 2014). This law covered carbonated soft drinks, mineral water, malt,
and beer with a five-cent deposit and originally included a two-cent handling fee. The handling
fee was first increased from 1 to 2.25¢ in 2010. The Massachusetts system awards ownership of
unredeemed deposits to the State’s General Fund under the Commonwealth’s existing “escheat
law,” or reversion of property the state. The uses for this fund are vast, but include the basic
functioning of government from employee payroll to funding for repairs and structural
maintenance (UMAS).
In 2014, the executive Director of Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group
(MASSPIRG) Janet Domenitz filed a proposed expansion to the Massachusetts bottle bill to
include non-carbonated beverage containers in the state’s deposit system, increase the handling
fee, and would send the unredeemed deposits into a Clean Environment Fund. These noncarbonated, non-alcoholic drinks include plastic water bottles, sports, and energy drinks, which
now make up a large percentage of the waste and litter stream. However, only 23% of these types
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of containers get recycled in the absence of an inclusive bottle bill, as compared with the 80%
recycling rate of containers that are covered by the deposit system (MASSPIRG). The details in
this proposed expansion were heavily opposed by the many members of the beverage and grocery
industries in Massachusetts. This opposition is outlined throughout this chapter within the context
of the current United States campaign finance system, with special attention to the implications of
the 2010 Supreme Court case Citizens United v FEC.
The push for an expanded and updated bottle bill is not unique to Massachusetts. By the
time that Massachusetts was considering Question 2 on the ballot, several other states including
Oregon and Maine had expanded the scope of their deposit systems, increased handling fee levels
where present, and even passed legislation to increase the deposit fee to a dime (Bottle Bill Task
Force). The reasoning behind these updates and edits to the bottle bill is mostly to increase the
amount recycled, redemption rate and economic stability of the deposit systems. A source noted
that she believed even the current handling fee should be increased, because it is already difficult
for redemption center owners to make ends meet for these small businesses (Lakeman).
Supporting and Opposing Coalitions to Question 2
In the specific case of Massachusetts, members of the supporting coalition for Question 2
included the state’s Sierra Club, MASSPIRG, the League of Women Voters, Audubon Society,
the Environmental League of Massachusetts, and others. Overall, these groups came together in
two formal coalitions: ‘Coalition for an Updated Bottle Bill’ and ‘Update the Bottle Bill.’ Several
state political leaders including former Governor Deval Patrick and several Democratic State
Representatives publicly supported the initiative.
These supporters desired to increase the scope of the deposit system to include more types
of beverage containers because bottle bills are considered more effective than curbside recycling
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at redirecting waste from landfills (MASSPIRG). The proposed increase handling fee increase
from 2.25¢ to 3.5¢ was supported by the Coalition for an Updated Bottle Bill because it provides
more funds to redemption centers to keep afloat in a difficult economy for small businesses. The
proposed changes in Question 2 would shift tens of millions of dollars generated per year from the
unredeemed deposits of the covered containers into the preexisting “Clean Environment Fund” or
CEF. This fund is legislatively allocated “to provide support for recycling, composting, solid waste
source reduction, and other environmental programs related to the bottle bill.” While not all of the
funds are actively put toward projects that “stimulate and support recycling, the bottle bill, and
other innovative solid waste programs”—it still undoubtedly helps meet the environmental goals
of many of the members of the supporting coalition (“Unclaimed Deposits”).
On the other side, the opposition to Question 2 organized themselves into a group called,
“No on Question 2: Stop Forced Deposits.” Its members included Beverage Associations, Nestlé,
and the Stop-and-Shop Supermarket Company. The proposed expansions were opposed by these
groups because they require more of their products to be included in the deposit, additional
organization, increasing transportation of used beverage containers, and raise out-of-pocket costs
(Wiseman). This opposition also dislikes that the funds from the unclaimed deposits are held by
the state for additional solid waste management, as it means that distributors and retailers are not
reimbursed for the cost of the handling fee they are required to cover.
Similarly to other case study states in this research, the bottle bill opposition had access to
a lot of money to fund “No on Question 2.” Spending over $9.1 million throughout the course of
the campaign (outspending the proponents nearly ten times over), the opposition to Question 2
framed its argument in three parts (Wiseman). First, they claim the bottle bill is a dated and old
idea and that there are preferable alternatives. Second, they argue that expanding the bottle bill is

Bluffstone, 61

too expensive because it means that the state is using public money to fund the bottle bill system
at an expanded level while it also pays for residential curbside recycling system for every resident.
Lastly, the opposition claims that the CEF is not effective or active in improving recycling and
solid waste management.
These three major messages were made public by television ads, pamphlets, radio
messages, and whatever money could buy. Christina Wiseman of the Massachusetts Audubon
Society described the scene during the campaign during an interview. “They [the opposition]
bombarded TV channels with misleading ads, claiming that a ‘No’ vote on the expanded bottle bill
would actually increase recycling. Not having much experience with campaigning myself, it was
pretty infuriating to witness. They claimed that we needed to focus on expanding curbside
recycling instead, as though a vote for them would somehow do that. In actuality they had no plan
for how to increase curbside, but their messaging was everywhere.”
Concerns about the false nature of the data and information spread through these
advertisements that “blanketed the airwaves” in the Boston Metropolitan area and across the state
is brought up frequently throughout the course of the campaign (Abel). The Coalition for an
Updated Bottle Bill tried to address the incorrect information through reaching out to the State
Attorney General and through their own advertisements, but ultimately, “Our campaign couldn’t
compete financially, and even once we started running our own TV ads it was too little too late”
(Wiseman).
Additionally, the bottled water industry is unique in of itself which began in earnest in the
1950’s at the same time that plastic, disposable containers entered the market. Bottled water comes
into direct competition with municipal water systems but has largely been successful because it is
marketed as pure and safe water, in contrast to the potential dangers of public water that
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unfortunately occur in many United States cities and towns. However, many of these bottled water
companies also get their water from municipal sources or through contracted access to rivers and
streams on publically-owned land (Miller, 25).
By 2014 the Citizens United v FEC ruling had taken place and corporations and unions
were experiencing newfound freedoms surrounding campaign finance (Citizens United). While a
direct correlation cannot be proven here, Question 2’s campaign just four years after Citizens
United was also one of the most expensive issue campaigns, from the opposition’s side, in the
state’s history. It seems reasonable to suppose that the campaign was impacted by the recent
expansion of the campaign finance system.
Massachusetts, as one of the original colonies of the country, has experienced a large
amount of human-caused environmental change. As is described in the book Remaking Boston,
the physical shoreline, local water quality, and other natural aspects of the region have been
irreversibly changed by the nearly four centuries of Western-American presence in the region
(Penna). While these types of impacts have unequivocally happened in many other places across
the United States, the other three states in the scope of this research were not impacted as
intensively as Massachusetts. In a recent Supreme Court case, Massachusetts led a group of states
who sued the EPA for its attempt to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the auspices that
they were pollutants and implicit in climate change. In the end the Court ruled that Massachusetts
did have standing to sue, and that the EPA cannot regulate these kinds of emissions without first
proving that current standards are insufficient or that there is a present danger that can be solved
through regulation (Meltz). The fact that Massachusetts was the lead prosecutor in this case
indicates that state leadership was willing to take a stand that many would consider “anti-
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environment” and also that Massachusetts leaders believed they had the political capital to go
against the EPA.
It is important to note that the issue of the environment has become increasingly polarized
across partisan lines over time. In the 1970s, many considered the environment to be a “politically
consensual issue” as was greatly exemplified by the largely bipartisan support for environmental
legislation under the Republican Nixon administration (McCright, 251). Since the consolidation
of the American conservative ideology after the end of the Cold War, studies show that between
1970 and 2012 there has been a steady decrease in support for environmental and conservation
legislation among Republicans and a corresponding increase in support in Democratic politicians
(McCright, 253). Therefore, as Massachusetts considered Question 2 in 2014, the electorate was
considerably more polarized on the issue along partisan lines during the campaign than in any of
the other case studies considered in this research. While there is a thriving environmental
community in Massachusetts, especially within its urban areas, this sense of a state environmental
culture is not as deeply incorporated into the state’s identity. Therefore, it does not appear that it
was a centering point for bottle bill supporters to rally around.
Concluding Comparisons: Washington and Massachusetts
In the case of Washington and Massachusetts the political settings in which they existed
were very different, with nationwide support for the policy in one and a campaign finance system
in the other that greatly enables corporations to take control of campaigns through their donations.
The defeat of Question 2 on the 2014 Ballot in the state of Massachusetts was made possible due
to the unique combination of factors of a post-Citizen’s United campaign finance system, highly
effective and expensive corporate messaging techniques, and the different perceptions of deposits
on bottled water. The absence of a powerful environmental ethos in either state made it initially
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more difficult to gather overwhelming public support that could mitigate the money-fueled tactics
of the opposing coalition.
Repeated attempts to pass bottle bill legislation on the ballot proved deadly in the past in
Washington and has made Massachusetts bottle bill supporters wary of attempting to pass another
expansion. Messaging tactics of innovative advertising was a powerful tool for the opposition in
the case of Washington, while a complete saturation of media outlets was the preferred method for
the “No on Question 2” campaign in Massachusetts. In Washington the supporting coalition was
taken by surprise by the strength of the opposition in the first attempt to pass a bottle bill in 1970,
and afterward was not able to overcome the advantage that the anti-bottle bill coalition held by
putting out initial messaging and tweaking during the elections of 1979 and 1982. In
Massachusetts, the supporting coalition was almost entirely made up of environmental groups and
did not include the voices of small and local businesses in their efforts to expand the bottle bill.
This gap in the coalition gave further legitimacy to the opposition’s claims that the bottle bill would
be expensive and anti-business. In the next chapter the case studies are considered in conjunction
to best consider how bottle bill deposit systems are effective as forms of environmental policy.
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Chapter 6
Are Bottle Bills Triple Bottom Line Sustainable? An MSSD Comparison of Case Studies

While the previous chapters discuss in detail the different ways that bottle bill legislation
can pass or not pass in the United States, there are also many takeaways from a consideration of
how these systems are structured in very similar ways but have different results. This chapter uses
Most Similar Systems Design, MSSD, to examine how the current-day, existing bottle bill systems
in my case studies work using the same basic structure to have different results. This chapter will
consider how the independent variables interact to create different results and levels of
effectiveness for deposit systems in Oregon, Maine, and Massachusetts. Washington is excluded
from this comparison because it does not currently have container deposit legislation. The
following table shows the details of the independent variables for each state as well as the
corresponding legislative outcome.
Administration
The first variable for consideration is the overall administration of the bottle bill system.
As has been previously mentioned, the administration of the Oregon Bottle Bill is run by the
Oregon Beverage Recycling Cooperative (OBRC) in communication with the Oregon Liquor
Control Commission (OLCC), which is the public agency that is responsible for enforcing
compliance and any deserved penalties or fines. The OBRC is responsible for what Cherilyn
Bertges, Outreach Manager, describes as the “day-to-day operations of the law.” This includes
coordinating and implementing the retrieval of all the used beverage containers, connecting these
recyclables with the recycling plants, and refunding the grocers with deposits.

Bluffstone, 66

Figure 6.1

Since OBRC is run by a membership that represents nearly every distributor in the state of Oregon,
the system is centralized and easily allows for coordination of the deposit refund system through
this joint representative body of industry. Therefore, the 5¢ deposits from purchased containers
can be forwarded from the retailers to OBRC, who then refund the retailers with the returned
deposits weekly (Bertges).
Despite being a legislatively initiated process in which any structural changes must be
voted upon and passed, the administration of the bottle bill in Oregon uses almost no public money.
This is because the process is funded by the funds from the unredeemed deposits that stay with
OBRC, essentially the distributors (Bertges). Since distributors are motivated through their
membership in OBRC to keep the rate of return high because they sell the recycled products to
buyers in the recycling market – occasionally at Oregon recycling plants owned by OBRC – there
is no perverse incentive to try and increase the amount of unredeemed containers.
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OBRC presents an interesting model of governance, because the administration of the
“recycling system [is run] by the same people who are making or distributing the regulated
beverages” (Powell). It is the first of its kind and is being carefully watched and considered by
those involved in solid waste management across the country because so far, it seems to effectively
meld together the goals of the bottle bill with the goals of the beverage industry. All in all, the
Oregon system is highly efficient and is continuously working to improve the procedures for
redemption in the state. For example, in 2009 the state legislature passed an amendment to the
system expanding the bottle bill in many ways, including increasing the deposit price to a dime in
2017 (Spendelow).
The administration of the Maine bottle bill was assigned quite ambiguously, but is now run
through the state government (Maine’s Bottle Bill, 1977). It has recently been transferred from the
Department of Agriculture to the Department of Environmental Protection, or DEP. DEP is
responsible for managing the bottle bill, which includes coordinating finances, managing the
location of redemption centers, distributor or retailer compliance, and dealing with issues of fraud.
The funds for this system are paid by state funds, some of which may be from the deposits of
unredeemed containers that the state of Maine partially retains through escheats if the distributor
of those containers are not a part of the comingling agreement (“Unclaimed Deposits”).
As was mentioned previously the Maine bottle bill law was written in such a way that “The
distributor or manufacturer that actually puts the bottle into circulation is the one that is required
to actually take it back out of circulation” (Milligan). This means that there are many different
entities, including hired third party pickup agents, who are in charge of picking up the used
beverage containers from all the retailers and redemption centers within the state of Maine. The
presence of multiple actors within such a varied industry requires additional organizational steps,
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which in turn makes the process more expensive and inefficient. Spendelow notes that the bottle
bill in Maine “is set up in a way that really pushes the cost up a lot…Because different beverage
companies sign up with different service companies to get the containers redeemed so they don’t
have to go out there and do it themselves. When you go into a redemption center, you see a hundred
containers and they are putting different thing in each one.” This sorting process increases
expenses because it takes up a lot of time, labor and physical floor space.
Massachusetts administers its bottle bill through the state’s Department of Environmental
Protection, the finances are managed by the Department of Revenue, and the Attorney General’s
Office, “deals with enforcement of any violations” with regulatory guidance from the Secretariat
of Energy and Environmental Affairs (Sylver). The DEP is also responsible for some day-to-day
operations of the bill including coordinating the stakeholders involved, problem-solving regulatory
and planning issues, and issuing redemption center licenses. This delegation of roles of the separate
parts of the Maine Bottle Bill between three state agencies allows for the specificity of work
performance by each department, but also necessitates inter-department communication,
especially because the state roles for regulation are not clearly specified in this law (Sylver).
The funds for administering the bottle bill system are, in a sense, provided by the
unredeemed deposits of used beverage containers, because some of those nickels go back into the
Massachusetts State General Fund. However, the administration process is quite complicated and
interacts with multiple state agencies, each with total budgets of greater than $29 million.
Consequently, it is unclear if the funding from the unredeemed deposits even comes close to
covering the costs of the time it takes to run the Massachusetts Bottle Bill. The decentralized nature
of the Massachusetts administrative system makes it less efficient.
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Deposit Price
The deposit price per container is an important variable to consider in each of these three
states’ bottle bills when trying to determine their systemic effectiveness. The deposit set on the
container by the legislation is the incentivizing factor that allows for the functioning of the entire
system. Attributing a monetary value to containers is therefore a disincentive to litter or otherwise
not return deposit containers for redemption, meeting anti-litter and recycling goals. It
simultaneously encourages picking up littered beverage containers. Therefore, the per-container
price assignment value is critical because it influences the level of return of deposited containers
as compared to the number of containers purchased with a deposit, called the redemption rate.
The redemption rate of containers covered by the state’s deposit system indicate the level
of participation in the system through comparing the number of containers purchased with the
number returned. A higher redemption rate is preferable for the system to run effectively. High
redemption rates allow the policy to achieve its goals of environmental conservation as well as to
maintain a profitable and consistent product supply for recycling industries and other related
aspects of local economy, such as redemption centers. This rate is highly influenced by the deposit
price of the container and increases in correlation with deposit price. The redemption rates for the
case studies in the scope of this research are listed in Figure 3.2.
Research shows that "If states set their bottle deposit high enough, harvesting recyclables
becomes viable employment for low-income households" (Ashenmiller, 2011). As deposits per
container increase, redemption rates do as well. This encourages a higher level of recycling and,
studies show, a lower presence of litter. This pricing is an indicator of the participation in the state
deposit systems of Oregon, Maine, and Massachusetts, which consequently also suggests the level
of environmental awareness in the state. It’s important to note that all of these states passed their
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bottle deposit systems into law 25 to 45 years ago, at a time when a nickel was worth between 20
and 28¢ today. Inflation is an important factor that makes a deposit system less effective because
people are less incentivized to redeem containers for 5¢ each than they would be for 25¢
(Spendelow).
In Oregon, there is a 5¢ deposit on all beverage containers except wine, liquor, milk, and
milk substitutes9, and a 2¢ deposit on the small, “stubby” brown beer bottles that are commonly
used at breweries. The redemption rate is for the state is calculated annually through the OBRC
and the Department of Environmental Quality. In 2015, the redemption rate was 68.26%, which
was much lower than the 94% redemption rate in 1973. Prior to the bottle bill’s implementation
there was an estimated 25% return rate (Spendelow, 2004). While the redemption rate displays
that public participation with the bottle bill has been decreasing over time, there are policies that
have been put in place in Oregon to improve the effectiveness of the bill. Since the rate has dropped
below 80% for two straight years, the 2011 expansion of the Oregon policy states that the deposit
price will increase to 10 cents per container, after verifying calculations confirm the redemption
rate (Oregon Deposit Law). The reasons for this decline are uncertain, but interviews and sources
have indicated that it is largely because of the declining quality of experience during the
redemption process along with the devaluation of the nickel since the bill’s original passage in
1971.
A major reason for the drop in the Oregon container redemption rate is because of the
negative customer experience at redemption sites. Sources describe the time, outdoor location,
mechanical malfunctions, and other inconveniences as reasons why the public participation rate
has dropped down to below 70% (Spendelow, Powell). Additionally, at the setting of the reverse

9

By 2018, as per the 2011 expansion of the bottle bill.
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vending machines, which are automated machines that accept, count, and break down depositcovered beverage containers, “there’s often a population of people who are returning containers
who, you know really need the money. They’re gleaners, they might be homeless or transient. And,
other people they kind of don’t want to go to the return areas because they don’t want to hang out
with them. For lack of a better word for that” (Bertges). This public perception has inspired a shift
in Oregon from reverse vending machines to indoor redemption centers, which is discussed in
detail later.
Studies of litter reduction in Oregon under the bottle bill has resulted in a wide variety of
figures, as different research used different percentages of beverage containers as a portion of the
litter profile along with other methodological differences. Additionally, many of these types of
studies are either conducted by or hired by groups that either actively support or oppose the bill.
The level of Oregon litter reduction ranges from 10% to 47% in volume between two studies
conducted in the state in 1974 (Gudger, ODEQ). The impact of this legislation on litter reduction
in Oregon has been highly politicized, with the uncertainty of its numerical effectiveness giving
fuel to the fire of the opposition.
Maine has a 5¢ deposit price for all types of beverage containers except dairy products and
unprocessed cider, and a 15¢ deposit on wine and liquor containers. Due to the many distributors
and redemption center owners who are directly involved in the redemption of beverage containers
in Maine, there is no singularly calculated redemption rate annually. However, in 2011, there was
an estimated 90% participation rate in the recycling of beverage containers in the state of Maine
(Lakeman). While this figure’s reliability is unclear, it is impressive that while many other states
are struggling to keep up their redemption rates, Maine seems to maintain a very high participation
rate in the bottle bill program. This is likely because there is a higher deposit price on wine and
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liquor containers, and because the law is quite comprehensive in the types of containers it includes
in the deposit system. Additionally, there is current discussion of the potential incorporation of
Maine produced cider and blueberry juice into the scope of the law (Lakeman).
Litter reduction under the Maine deposit law was found to be a 34-64% decrease in total
litter in 1980. More anecdotally, municipal workers observed a significant decline in the amount
of solid waste entering Maine landfills within just 4 months of the law's enactment (USGAO, 9).
Additionally, as a state with a large tourist industry Maine would likely spend money to remove
litter in order to maintain its pristine and rustic public image. Therefore, litter reduction
structuralized as a bottle bill system is likely to save between $100,000-$250,000 for litter clean
up annually (Ginn).
The state of Massachusetts has a price of 5¢ on beer, malt, carbonated soft drinks, &
mineral water containers. In 2014 the state had a 64.08% redemption rate of beverage containers
through their deposit redemption system (Massachusetts Deposit Law). Massachusetts has both
the lowest redemption rate and the least comprehensive type of legislation (in terms of types of
containers included) of the three case study states considered in this section of my research. These
realities along with the fact that this state has just a nickel value on all its returnables and has most
recently experienced a huge anti-bottle bill campaign in 2014 makes it the least effective bottle
bill in consideration of this research. Further, with the memory of the defeat of Question 2 looming
in recent memory, sources say that there is currently no incentive or political capital for the
legislature to try and update the bottle bill (Wiseman).
A 1987 study in Massachusetts found a 30-35% decrease in litter after the bottle bill’s
implementation in 1983 (EAF). However, between 2000 and 2010 the sales of juices, sports drinks,
juices, and bottled water have increased their sales nationally by over four times. People in
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Massachusetts who collect used beverage containers for redemption share that “it’s frustrating that
most bottles they find aren’t redeemable” and call it “a waste” because many of these otherwise
containers are going to landfills due to their lack of deposit (Abel). The Massachusetts bottle bill’s
incomprehensive nature, political stagnation on the issue, and low deposit price degrades the
efficiency of the entire system and makes the bottle bill increasingly less effective in achieving its
goals of environmental conservation and litter reduction.
Bottle Bills as a Social Service
Bottle bill deposit systems are not only useful for environmental and economic
motivations, but can also be a form of alternative income for people. A significant amount of users
of the redemption system are fundraisers, unhoused, transient, or low-income people. Described
as an unintended consequence of the bottle bill, which was specifically crafted with environmental
goals to decrease litter and increase recycling, the potential to make money off of redeeming
beverage containers is a widely accessible social service (Spendelow).
Many groups use the redemption of beverage containers as a technique for fundraising.
Lakeman points out that in Maine, “a lot of our deposits or unclaimed deposits is a big source of
charity around here. I remember as a kid doing a lot of bottle drives for sports teams and things
like that.” Because of this, people know to save up a collection of their containers to give away if
they are not going to redeem the deposits themselves. This format of donating containers is
described as quite widely supported, and seems to be understood to be a social benefit of the bottle
bill.
However, the public perception of the bottle bill as a social service mechanism changes
when the users in consideration are not Girl Scouts or sports teams, but people experiencing
homelessness, low-income, or who otherwise desire ways to make extra money. Interestingly, this
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is an aspect of the bottle bill that “even its supporters are loath to mention” (Abel). A study shows
that in Santa Barbara area of California, close to 60 percent of the income from redeemed deposits
was collected by households earning less than $25,000 annually. The study also found that the
lowest one percent of earners – those making $10,000 or below – retrieve around 20 percent of the
total value of all the beverage containers redeemed (Ashenmiller, 2011).
As these people are typically not the initial purchasers of the beverage containers, many
spend significant amounts of time collecting or scrounging for unredeemed beverage containers.
This frequently includes going through public or private garbage or recycling receptacles. Bottle
bills increase these informal activities through incentivizing recycling (Gowan, 2010). Though the
1988 Supreme Court ruling of California v Greenwood defined one’s garbage as “outside the
constitutionally guaranteed privacy of the home,” it is still a practice that is often frowned upon in
many communities on the basis that the activity of scrounging constitutes “offensive conduct.”
Some cities and municipalities have gone so far as to impose crackdowns on activities such as
dumpster diving and bottle collection, calling it deplorable acts of “thievery” (Ferrell, 11).
Over the course of my interviews, different sources indicated the ways that their different
communities interact with beverage container collection. Sarah Lakeman describes that her
experience in Portland, Maine is that, “if I can’t make it to my redemption center I don’t put my
bottles and cans in with my normal recycling but I would probably leave them separate because
there are the same people that come around every week and they would look through everybody’s
recycling bins for the bottles and cans to take. I’d save them, give them away to those people, or
if I saw them go by I would run out and give them my bag.” My family in Portland, Oregon has
similarly established a relationship with a homeless man in my neighborhood, for whom we collect
our bottles and cans until the next time he visits. In Massachusetts, a newspaper article chronicles
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the story of a low-income family in the city who depend upon the collection of deposit-covered
containers for a significant portion of their income. These collectors note that Massachusetts’
Question 2 would have allowed them to, “redeem bottles from water, sports drinks, and other noncarbonated beverages that they now ignore...and [they] could more than double their income”
(Abel, 2014).
As was stated earlier, Oregon is switching its redemption system from one primarily of
reverse vending machines to indoor, employee-run redemption centers. Much of the reason behind
this is because, “it upsets a lot of people who live in the neighborhoods where a lot of people
redeem things – they don’t particularly like homeless people coming through their area”
(Spendelow). Therefore, many of these planned redemption centers are going to be in less
centralized neighborhood spaces like grocery stores usually are. Most are placed in the suburbs
and none of the redemption centers are in Downtown Portland, where there is a large community
of unhoused people due to the presence of shelters and other services (BottleDrop Centers).
When asked to consider if this change in Oregon’s system would impact accessibility of
the bottle redemption process to homeless or low income people, people responded that it is likely
to be “a tradeoff, of an environmental benefit to a social service loss” (Powell). As many lowincome or unhoused people don’t have easy access to a car, it seems likely that the disbursement
of these redemption centers will make container redemption less accessible to many of the people
for whom it provides the greatest social service (Ashenmiller, 64). With many states around the
country switching to the system of redemption centers which provide jobs and a more regulated
environment for redemption, this switch will change the way that the bottle bill can function as an
accessible social service for unhoused, transient, and low-income people.
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Chapter 7
The International Implications of Bottle Bills: Outsourcing Your Sense of Justice?

Recycling is often considered a beginner’s step toward sustainability and solid waste
management. In some cases, recycling has also taken on the role of what I shall call “placebo
environmentalism.” For example, in clinical trials of dangerous illnesses, some patients are given
placebo medicine in response to which they may feel better, despite the fact that they were not
actually given active medicine and the illness itself is probably still continuing. Some people
consider placebos -- essentially the strength of human willpower -- to be enough to start a true
healing process. Considering climate change as the “illness” in question and recycling as the
placebo medicine, the latter is simply not enough to solve the former. And yet, as is depicted in
the graphic novel As the World Burns, many people consider recycling to be sufficient
environmental effort from the individual when it is actually playing into the capitalist and colonial
system that originated the problem in the first place (Jensen, 2011).
While bottle deposit legislation greatly increases recycling rates, improves the quality of
recyclable products, reduces litter, and many other benefits that are outlined throughout the course
of this research, this study would be remiss in considering these systems under the TBL definition
of sustainability if it did not ultimately ask, what happens to the recycled products after they are
redeemed? The answer to this question varies widely state by state, but the options include: instate facilities, out-of-state facilities, and export of the product internationally. This final section
of this research will consider the environmental, social, and economic implications of the
international export of American recyclables, specifically to Asia, and with these realities in
consideration can this action truly be considered “sustainable”?
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Activism through consumerism is not a viable method to solve the pressing environmental
problems that face the world today, but I do not hold any grandiose ideas that the bottle bill is a
silver bullet environmental policy. Still, I think that bottle bills effect greater changes past
consumer activism, due to its accidental role as a social service, how it provides opportunities for
communities to learn to fight back against corporate interference in the political process, and
because it creates a very clean recyclable product. This latter aspect has a large implication on
issues of social and environmental justice, as is discussed in this chapter.
Where do Oregon, Maine, and Massachusetts send their recycled products?
Many distributors have specific relationships with domestic recycling plants for the
specific types of recycled materials collected that can be collected through a bottle bill system:
PET plastic, glass, and aluminum.10 Considering the three case study states with functioning bottle
bills today, Oregon has completely eliminated its international export of redeemed recyclables
from the Oregon bottle bill system. Prior to 2012 the OBRC sold its PET product to the highest
bidder on the market, which was typically to a buyer in Asia. A quite low-value product, Cherilyn
Bertges of the OBRC says that Asian markets were “the only place[s] we could really get money
for it.” However, the cooperative became a partial owner of the Oregon PET, or ORPET facility
in Southern Oregon. Afterward, most of the plastic products from ORPET stay in the Northwest
of the country, although some of the buyers are located on the east coast. Glass is processed at a
plant called Glass to Glass in Portland. Part of the reason that the parent companies of OwensIllinois and eCullet chose to locate their glass recycling facility in Portland is because, “the city
has a reliable supply of waste glass provided through the 'Oregon container deposit programme'”

10

It must be emphasized that the data presented from the recycling and waste industries is notoriously difficult to
track and in some, cases, unreliable and should be treated more as estimations than fact. This is because these
industries are societal byproducts and as many loads are mixed and are not precisely calculated (Minter, 2013).
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(Packaging-Gateway). Oregon’s aluminum collected from the bottle bill is sent to the Midwest of
the country, due to the absence of aluminum smelters in the Northwest region (Bertges).
Aluminum smelting is a notoriously dirty and polluting industrial process (OECD, 9).
In Maine the story of the end-product of the recyclable material is more difficult to follow
because it is not a centrally organized system. All of the distributors who are involved in the bottle
bill either directly pick up the redeemed containers of their products, or hire a contracted third
party to do it for them. After that, the recycled material is in the hands of each of the distributors
to decide where the products should go. Elizabeth Milligan of TOMRA, one of the third party
pickup agencies for the redeemed beverage containers, says that the market dictates the end
location of the glass, plastic, or aluminum that they collect on behalf of the beverage companies
that contract them. She says that all materials go out of the state of Maine, glass is recycled at a
plant called Strategic Materials in Massachusetts to be melted down for new bottlers or fiberglass.
Aluminum is sent to the smelting factory Aloca in New York. The collected plastic products by
TOMRA are sent to a wide variety of places, depending on the market prices and other forces.
Milligan says that “some of it goes overseas, some it stays within the United States in various
locations, and some of it goes to Canada.” These products can be turned into any number of plastic
items including new bottles, polyester, fleece, carpet backing, or if it is a high quality it can be
turned into resin (Milligan).
In Massachusetts, my sources were not able to provide specific information about the next
steps for the recycled products after they are recycled through the bottle bill system. Similar to
Maine, Massachusetts relies upon the individual distributors—whether national beverage
corporation or local brewing company—to transport the beverage containers after they are
redeemed either through their own services or through a contracted pickup agent. Without
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confirmation, it seems to be a reasonable conclusion that the path of Massachusetts’ recyclables
are similar to those of Maine’s--that the glass stays in-state at Strategic Materials and aluminum
also somewhere domestic such as Aloca. As Environmental Planner for the state of Massachusetts
Sean Sylver points out that material, “coming out of the bottle bill redemption stream is very clean
material because there’s really no sorting involved...from speaking with professionals who use
recycled materials in the production of new materials they want those particular bales because they
are clean and they know that they’re high quality. So from a domestic perspective from where in
America you’re trying to produce goods to a certain standard...you are going to get domestic
producers who are going to want that recycled material.” However, it seems that because PET
plastic has a very low market value, frequently the only way to make a profit off of those materials
is through export abroad, often to Asian markets.
It is largely PET plastic material that is exported from U.S. bottle bill systems to Asia for
recycling by container ship. China imports more than half of the world’s plastic exports, which is
estimated to be around a $500 million dollar industry for the country (Guilford). As China is the
most common destination for exported plastic such as those derived from bottle bill systems, this
example will focus specifically on the situation of plastics in China, although plastics are also
imported from the United States to places such as India and Thailand (Minter). Upon arrival in a
Chinese port, most likely the plastics are sent to one of the 60,000 small, family-run plastic
recycling workshops, likely in the Wen’an County in northeast China (Minter, 145). In Wen’an
County, there are businesses that specialize in the recycling of certain kinds of plastics, including
PET. There is a complete chain of industry present, “from sorting and cleansing, to melting,
shredding, granulating, and molding” (China Daily US).
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The Plastic Recycling Industry in Wen’an County, China
While this import of recyclable plastic to places such as China is supported by market
forces and helps meet the growing demand for plastics in the country, it is not without cost. Despite
being more formalized than industries such as electronics recycling, the plastics recycling industry
in China is endangering the health of the surrounding environment and the people involved in the
industry. Just a quarter of a century ago, the Wen’an County area could be described as, “bucolic,
– an agricultural region renowned for its streams, peach trees and simple, rolling landscape”
(Minter, 146). Now, the pollution from these processes has made Wen’an County residents
reluctant to drink the local water, for fear that it is contaminated (China Daily US). As Minter
writes in his book, “nobody wants to live in Wen’an” (152). Families who can afford it spend most
of their time outside of Wen’an, and quickly send their children out of the region to attend higher
quality schools.
A 2016 study finds that samples of Wen’an County road dust show accumulations of
contaminants from plastics and heavy metals associated with plastic production that are 1-2 levels
of magnitude higher than in other areas without plastic industry. These levels of contaminants
exceed the recommended limits for children and pose a potential health risk to children over longterm exposure through inhalation or direct contact with road dust (Tang et al, 634). A local resident
notes that high blood pressure and movement-restricting pulmonary problems are commonplace
here, even occurring in young people, which never used to happen (Minter, 157). He also
recognized the problem of “the stress related to living in a, ‘dirty, stinky, noisy environment. It
takes a physical and mental toll’” (152). Further, some companies indiscriminately provide
Wen’an plastic processors exemptions to the Restriction of Hazardous Substances evaluation,
which is a standardized test intended to require compliance to environmental, safety and health
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standards (151). Further, “environmental and safety equipment is neither required nor available at
the local equipment and chemical dealers” (148).
In the past few years the Chinese government has been more active in acknowledging, and
in some cases taking action, its country’s dangerous pollution problems. A major attempt to stop
China from being used as a “dumping ground” for the west was when the government shut down
the plastics recycling industry in Wen’an County in 2011. On grounds of addressing issues of
pollution, the government banned all plastic material imports into the area. Without an alternate
plan to address pollution or provide other forms of employment to the region, this attempt left
hundreds of thousands of people without livelihoods, including a large migrant worker population
from other areas of China (China Daily US).
The policy shifted in February, 2013 when Beijing announced its new Green Fence policy,
in which the nation shared their intention to reject “poorly sorted or dirty shipments of recyclable
waste from foreign exporters” into China (Berg). China rejected 68,000 tons in the first five months
of the Green Fence through random inspections and sent the shipments back to its country of origin
at their expense. This policy puts the onus on countries like the United States to improve their
quality, sorting, and decreased levels of contamination and has even suppressed prices of PET
products on the west coast (Guy, 2013). However, as the Chinese demand for recycled plastics
remains powerfully strong and illegal exports are being smuggled into the nation to meet this
demand, it remains unclear how much impact the rejection of the worst-of-the-worst imports will
have on the pollution levels, and health of people in places such as Wen’an County (Guilford).
Bottle bill products from the United States are typically of high quality and are increasingly
less likely to enter the international recycling market because of their demand domestically. If
products are exported abroad from these systems, they are likely to be PET plastics. If this plastic
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is sent to China, recyclables from bottle bill systems would probably pass a Green Fence
inspection. Nonetheless, this analysis of the international plastic industry shows that the act of
recycling in of itself is not as benign as the simple “sustainable” action that many perceive it to be.
In actuality, recycling of plastics tend to result in environmental degradation and unsafe and
unhealthy working conditions. While bottle bill systems are less likely to contribute to the
environmental injustices as outlined here in Wen’an County, they still contribute to the greater
problem that creates a market for plastics in China, and elsewhere in Asia.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions: Bottle Deposit Systems in the Bigger Picture
The exploration of the highly specific topic of container deposit legislation systems in the
United States begets bigger questions about the past and present nature of the nation’s political
climate, campaign finance system, environmental policy techniques, international export trends,
and social class norms. The MDSD analytical framework allows for the comparison of states from
different sides of the country to conclude the variety of ways that differing situations can result in
either the passage or defeat of bottle bill legislation. The MSSD comparative system presents a
framework for the similar bottle bill systems of Oregon, Maine and Massachusetts to display the
reasons behind their different levels of effectiveness in meeting the bottle bill’s prescribed, and
unprescribed goals of environmental protection and economic development. The overall
conclusions of the effectiveness of these two systems of comparison sheds light on several methods
of how the state political system can support or not support effective or ineffective bottle deposit
systems on the state level.
This research displays that if put to a vote, the state legislature tends to be a far more
favorable method to pass bottle bill legislation than the public initiative or ballot system. The
presence of strong political champions, the legislature’s structural ability to compromise and
negotiate, the presence of a cross-sectoral supporting coalition, and the allocated relinquishment
of power or economic benefit to beverage retailers or distributors within the bill are all critical
factors in passing a bottle bill through the state legislature. Compromise is a critical part of politics,
and bottle bills are no exception. This also leads to the conclusion that bottle bills have the potential
to be an issue with bipartisan support, and must be so in order to pass in most state legislatures.
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However, in the current polarized and highly partisan political climate—with the
environment inexplicitly as one such polarizing issue—bipartisan bottle bill support for
environmental policy such as bottle bill systems seems increasingly less likely. The bottle bill
shows that the political climate wasn’t always this way, as Republican and Democratic politicians
proposed and advocated for bottle bills in their states because of its multitude of benefits
economically and environmentally. Remembering the successes of bipartisanship and the
situations in which it was made possible is critical in the politically polarized and largely stagnant
United States government that we see today. Yet, even in states such as Massachusetts, where just
17% of the state legislature seats are filled by Republican politicians, legislative action to expand
the existing bottle bill system still proves to be very politically tenuous.
Through the public ballot, outreach and an effective messaging stance is critical to pass a
piece of bottle bill legislation. As the goal is to convince the majority of the state to actively support
in a bottle deposit system with a “Yes” vote in the election, a successful bottle bill coalition will
organize widespread outreach, speakers, in attempts to unify the supporting voters, as was done in
the state of Maine. This effort can be successful with either access to significant financial
resources, or a passionate volunteer base. The latter is largely successful because grassroots
movements gain their power from the passion of their supporters and the connectivity of people’s
different communities (Hart, 2001). It takes a lot of time, energy and resources to win over the
public’s support for a ballot initiative, especially in the face of heavy opposition. Therefore, it is
important that the first ballot attempt is conducted at the appropriate time and is successful. After
all, the state legislature will refuse to act on the issue for a while due to a perceived lack of public
support from being defeated on the ballot. Further, the ballot itself will prove less and less forgiving
because the opposition has already established a winning, hard-to-beat strategy.
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The public ballot proves especially difficult to pass bottle bill legislation -- or more
recently, any kind of legislation -- because of what McCuan and Stambough refer to as the
professionalization of the initiative process (52). Through easy access to large amounts of
resources in order to access superior consultants, advertisements, polls, or employees this new
professionalization of what was intended to be the people’s legislative check on government, may
itself directly pose a threat to the direct form of democracy that is the public ballot. The case of
Massachusetts’ Question 2 in 2014 is a prime example of this professionalization. Through
outspending the supporting coalition by more than 8 million dollars the bottle bill opposition was
successfully able to concisely frame their messaging of the bottle bill as a tax through a deluge of
advertisements. By getting voters to be even slightly uncertain about if a policy change will do
them bad or good, the opposition has already won (Wiseman). Further, the example of the 1970
campaign in Washington displayed that the competing presence of a proposed Litter Law disrupted
support for the bottle bill on the same ballot. Alternative policies are often deadly to ballot
initiatives, because choices divide public support and typically serve to confuse the messaging and
differentiating purposes between the two proposals.
This examination of bottle bills tells a lot of information about the level of corporate
influence in the United States today. First, it displays that corporate oppositional funding is
omnipresent throughout all stages of and attempts to pass bottle bill legislation. This oppositional
funding can prove dangerous, although not necessarily fatal to bottle bill systems.
A key variable that can powerfully push back against the presence of massive amounts of
corporate funding is an independent, environmental state cultural ethos. “Historical studies often
treat environmental politics and environmental ideals as separate topics. In this book we trace their
interaction. Politics drew inspiration from perceptions of the environment, and in turn politics
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encouraged new ways of thinking about the environment” (Judd, 2003). This concept is
particularly true in less-densely populated places such as Maine and Oregon11 that depend upon
the pristine nature of their environment for the tourism industry, and the health of the rural and
agricultural sector. However, this state ethos of environmentalism goes deeper than economic
incentives. Judd and Beach’s concept of the “environmental imagination” describes the “core
beliefs that animate the political defense of nature” (X). When combined with a well-organized,
multi-sector coalition of supporters who work to validate this ‘environmental imagination’ through
messaging and people-power, can prove triumphant. While many other states with bottle bills may
have a state culture of environmentalism, it is typically those who successfully activate their
environmental imagination who are able to pass heavily-opposed legislation such as bottle deposit
systems, into law.
Ultimately, in the grand scheme of a world with a changing climate, war and violence,
volatile economic markets and a dwindling resource supply, bottle deposit legislation can appear
to be just a drop in the bucket of progress, or contrastingly a slight inconvenience for the beverage
industry. However, in a world of ‘corporate democracy’ in many ways it seems like no fish is too
small to fry if profits may at all be affected by environmental policy (Coates, 657). Additionally,
bottle bills display the issues that come from incorrect information being shared by campaigns as
though they are fact. The case studies of Massachusetts and Washington especially display that
this type of confusion, even if proven incorrect, can greatly shake public support. Bottle bills
display on a micro level the macro issue of dirty corporate influence in the political system, and
the great extent to which industry will act in order to protect its bottom line -- often at the expense
of the environment.

11

Oregon and Maine both had populations of less than 3 million when their bottle bill’s first passage (US Census).
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The bottle bill systems considered in this research also show how society tends to isolate
its most vulnerable members, as well as exemplifies ways that social taboos, such as those that
disapprove of scrounging through trash or recycling, can become incorporated into local or state
law. The reason for this exclusion stems from the classist stigma within our society that causes
non-homeless or middle-income people to dislike, or feel uncomfortable being in the presence of
homeless or low-income people. Bottle bill systems were structurally intended as a policy for litter
reduction and resource conservation, not as a social service. Over time, the administrators of bottle
bill systems have been changing to better accommodate non-homeless or non-low income users to
meet these environmental goals. It appears that during this process low-income, transient, and
unhoused bottle bill users are directly being isolated from the social service that the bottle bill
inadvertently provides. By recognizing this trend and bringing the issue to the administrators of
the bottle bill, perhaps action can be taken to reverse this trend and serve all bottle bill users
equally.
In the end, one must ask, who does the bottle bill serve: the people who use and value it
the most, or the people who are most easily welcomed into stores and community spaces? With
these kinds of considerations in mind, the bottle bill provides a valuable opportunity to make
environmentalism more accessible and intersectional, which are areas of needed improvement for
the entire environmental movement. As Jensen writes, “the human species must acknowledge that
any future that allows us to retain our humanity will jettison capitalism, patriarchy and white
supremacy - and be based on an ecological worldview.” It is due to this reason that I framed this
entire research project under a Triple Bottom Line definition of sustainability, because “without a
rejection of the dominator logic of white supremacy and patriarchy, there is no future worth living
in” (Jensen, 2013).
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The political, environmental, and economic situations in the states profiled in this research
have changed vastly since the passage of their original bottle bills. Sylver says that, “I think that
any time you have a law that’s been around for thirty years there’s tweaks that need to occur…to
make the system work more smoothly.” As time passes, inaction on updating the state’s deposit
system in order to best fit its current situation does a disservice to the legislation and the people
that it serves by making it a less effective policy. Despite the presence of barriers to passage such
as corporate funding of opposition due to the allowances provided by Citizens United, the results
from this research that outline the different ways that bottle bill campaigns were successful or
defeated could prove useful in future attempts to keep state bottle bill systems comprehensive and
effective through updates or attempted amendments or repeals.
Finally, an investigation of bottle bill systems and their effectiveness raises the question,
who do we make environmental policy for? While many tout the many environmental, social and
economic benefits of bottle bills, the greater systemic pressures that allow bottle deposit systems
to function once they’re passed into law are due to the presence of domestic and international
markets for the recycled products to continue to make more new products. While the reuse of
existing material saves significant energy and some argue that “The worst, dirtiest recycling is still
better than the very best clear-cut forest or the most up-to-date open pit mine,” it is important to
remember that the underlying motivations making the system possible are entirely economic and
profit-based (Minter, 7). The fact that bottle bills use the capitalist system to obtain environmental
and social benefits along the way is significant to be sure. Yet, these non-economic values must
be continually reinforced and protected at times because the policy is dependent upon an economic
profit-based foundation that constantly threatens to overpower these other benefits.
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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has decidedly
argued that the human-imposed combustion of fossil fuels has caused massive and unprecedented
changes in climate and that these changes can greatly disrupt the basic functioning of life on the
planet. Within this period of global crisis, it is critical to practice sustainably sound procedures in
all aspects of human life, industry, and government. Further, this crisis requires to urgent action
to reduce resource consumption -- especially those that compound the impact of greenhouse gases.
Resource conservation efforts are an important part of this work. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) reports that recycling is an important adaptation and mitigation measure
for the industrial sector as it can improve energy efficiency, reduce product demand through more
intensive product use, and ultimately can “help reduce GHG emissions below the baseline level”
(IPCC Synthesis Report, 102).
This research displays the far-reaching impacts that even a statewide environmental policy can
have and suggests that legislation of this kind is most easily passed through the state legislature,
and oppositional funding can be overcome in a state that maintains a strong environmental ethos
through the hard work of compromising, coalition-building, and grassroots organizing. The most
effective bottle deposit systems are centralized and are self-funded, with the trailblazing example
of OBRC showing new, innovative ways of structuring environmental. Bottle bills are a valuable
and effective type of recycling because they produce a product of such high quality that it mostly
does not feed into the international recycling market, which is a system that is fraught with social
and environmental injustices.
The concept of the bottle bill was a spark within the nation’s ‘Environmental Imagination.’
It provided an innovative way to prioritize state environmental values over corporate desires.
Bottle bills have played important roles in decreasing litter, conserving energy, creating clean
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recyclable products, developing new jobs, and providing a valuable form of alternative income. In
all of these areas, bottle bills have required people, industry, and government to think differently
about the consumer culture and corporate interference in politics that pervades the United States.
While bottle bill systems have not gotten close to solving these larger issues, they do initiate
valuable discussions on wider environmental, social, and economic issues.
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